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Article

The Death of the Firm
†

June Carbone & Nancy Levit

††

INTRODUCTION
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings
to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the
rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers,
and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or
another. When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these
1
people.

In the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby—and more generally in corporate and employment law—the
firm as entity is disappearing as a unit of legal analysis. We
use the term “firm” in this Article in the sense that Ronald
Coase did to describe a form of business organization that orders the production of goods and services through use of a system internal to the enterprise rather than through the use of
2
independent contractors. The idea of an “entity” in this sense
† Robina Chair in Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota Law School.
†† Curators’ and Edward D. Ellison Professor of Law, University of Missouri – Kansas City School of Law. We thank William K. Black, Margaret F.
Brinig, Naomi Cahn, Paul Callister, Mary Ann Case, Lynne Dallas, Robert
Downs, Max Eichner, Martha Fineman, Barb Glesner Fines, Claire Hill, Brett
McDonnell, Amy Monahan, Charles O’Kelley, Hari Osofsky, Irma Russell, Dan
Schwarcz, Lynn Stout, and Erik P.M. Vermeulen for their helpful comments
on drafts of this Article and Tracy Shoberg and Shiveta Vaid for their research
support. Copyright © 2017 by June Carbone & Nancy Levit.
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
2. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–93
(1937). The term “corporation,” in contrast, refers to a particular type of business organization with a corporate charter. Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating
Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 331 (2014). Thus, while all corporations are in some sense “firms,” not all firms are corporations. For other discussions of the legal significance of the firm concept, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1001–33
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refers to an institution that is greater than the sum of its parts,
one that has a legal existence, recognizable identity, and loyalty claims independent of the individuals who may own it or
3
control it at any given time. Popular accounts sometimes read
Hobby Lobby and similar decisions as conferring rights on the
entity and thus enhancing the institutional character of the
claims, insisting, as presidential candidate Mitt Romney did in
4
2012, that “[c]orporations are people, my friend.”
As Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hobby Lobby makes
clear, however, reading these opinions as enhancing the institutional character of the rights conferred would be a mistake.
Instead, these decisions are the culmination of a decades-long
attack on the reification of the corporation and an assault on
the very notion of corporate interests separate from the narrowly defined interests of a company’s immediate owners. These
decisions, even as they recognize corporate First Amendment
claims, erode the status of the corporation as an entity that imposes institutional constraints on executive freedom of action,
has institutional obligations to its employees, or can be held institutionally accountable as a community citizen. Within this
jurisprudence, the corporation becomes, as Justice Alito ob5
serves, a means to an end, no different from the corporate jet
or the supply contract with a Chinese subsidiary. Thus, Hobby
Lobby and the line of cases it represents signals the “death of
the firm” as an important component of legal analysis across a
variety of fields.
This Article is the first to consider the implications of this
ideological shift in the treatment of the firm with respect to the
corresponding construction of business entities as appropriate
partners for the government in advancing public purposes. Following Hobby Lobby, many scholars have questioned the deci(summarizing the literature on the status of the corporation); Timothy P.
Glynn, Taking the Employer out of Employment Law? Accountability for Wage
and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 203 (2011) (describing the impact of firm disaggregation on
employees).
3. This idea of an entity that supplies identity and commands loyalty is
rooted in media theory and remains influential in the management literature
as a way to motivate employees. See infra text accompanying notes 56–59.
4. Maureen Dowd, Power to the Corporation!, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011,
at SR11.
5. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; see also GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY 77–79 (2016) (describing the difficulty of holding corporations accountable
for actions taken within their supply chains).
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sion on three grounds. First, First Amendment scholars have
challenged the Court’s conclusion that a corporation can exer6
cise religious rights and, if so, in what circumstances. Second,
constitutional scholars have explored the status of corporate
entities, with some arguing that corporations are creations of
the State, and thus can be defined and regulated in whatever
ways the State chooses, and others arguing that corporations
have constitutional standing that imposes some limits on gov7
ernment action. Third, corporate scholars have revisited the
issue of management fiduciary duties, questioning whether
managers must seek to advance the firm’s commercial interests
or whether they can promote other values, such as religious or
8
civic interests. What all three critiques have in common is that
they assume that a system of employer-provided, governmentsubsidized health care (and implicitly other benefits) is appropriate.
This Article takes a different approach. It takes seriously
9
the Supreme Court embrace of the firm as a mere fiction that
6. Besides questioning the reasoning of the Hobby Lobby decision itself,
these critiques raise two additional questions that are beyond the scope of this
paper. The first is who defines the religious stance of a corporate entity. The
logic of the Hobby Lobby majority suggests that the question is a matter of
contract among the owners. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for
Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 790–91 (2015) (discussing the ability of
corporate officers to advance ends other than profit maximization). Hobby
Lobby is unusual in that it is a closely held corporation, with a religious
statement of purposes in its corporate charter, and it is therefore not clear how
many other entities will thus be able to assert such a purpose. Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2765–66. The second broader issue is whether commercial actors
generally can impose their religious preferences on others who do not share
such preferences in the context of commercial decisions. See Elizabeth Sepper,
Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 193, 232 (2015)
(discussing interaction of religious liberty and anti-discrimination law).
7. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 2 (summarizing the literature on the status
of the corporation and arguing that the issue has never been definitely resolved); Padfield, supra note 2, at 331–32 (arguing that corporations are creations of the State, and thus the government can impose conditions on the
grant of corporate charters).
8. See McDonnell, supra note 6.
9. The firm is not, however, a complete fiction as it is an entity chartered
by law with the power to enter into contracts and perform other binding acts.
See Lynn Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity,
Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
685, 705 n.61 (2015) (“Even thoughtful observers sometimes describe corporations as ‘legal fictions.’ Any good lawyer knows this phrase is an oxymoron.
There is nothing fictional about legal institutions, which exercise enormous
influence over human beings. That corporations are invisible does not make
them fictional or unreal. Gravity, too, is invisible.”). In a similar sense, corpo-
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serves no purpose and has no obligations other than the interests of its owners, and considers the consequences of that shift
for the advancement of public purposes. It locates the Court’s
endorsement of this limited conception of the firm in two longstanding changes that reinforce each other. First, an ideological
shift rejected mid-twentieth-century managerialism, which had
treated firms as more than the sum of their parts, and replaced
it with agency-cost theory that treated the firm as a mere nex10
us of contracts. The agency-cost movement accused the managerial era firms of complacency, celebrated the corporate takeover market of the 1980s, embraced “pay for performance”
schemes that greatly increased executive compensation, and
today cheers on the activist investors who focus corporate at11
tention on maximizing short-term share prices. In this perspective, the owners of a privately held company like Hobby
Lobby are free to treat the company (and its employees) however they like, and large publicly traded corporations, with thousands of employees, serve no interests other than to maximize
the return to their shareholders. This ideological movement
marked the “death of the firm” as a subject of importance in
management theory and in the legal regulation of corporate interests.
Second, an era of technological change and globalization
has replaced the brick-and-mortar behemoths of the industrial
era with more network-like commercial entities. This second
change marks the rise of companies that continually reconstitute themselves. They change product lines, spin off underperforming divisions and acquire new ones, employ an ever12
changing cast of millennial “knowledge nomads” in their
rations may voluntarily assume contractual obligations to their employees, it
is just that these obligations do not follow automatically from the nature of the
business entity.
10. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, The Misapplication of Mr. Michael Jensen: How Agency Theory Brought down the Economy and Why It
Might Again, in MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S.
FINANCIAL CRISIS 29–32 (Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010),
http://www.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dobbin/files/the_misapplication_of_mr._
michael_jensen_dobbin_and_jung.pdf (summarizing agency-cost theory).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 178–79, 199, 246–51.
12. Mallory Stark, High Turnover: Should You Care?, HARV. BUS. WK.
(July 26, 2004), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4277.html; see also PWC, TALENT
MOBILITY: 2020 AND BEYOND 19 (2012) (noting that among millennials in
business and technology, thirty-eight percent are “always actively on the lookout for other opportunities,” while another forty-three percent are not actively
looking, “but would be open to offers”).
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skilled ranks, replace the less skilled with a contingent workforce (or robots), and relocate factories, warehouses, and headquarters to the countries or regions with the lowest costs, best
13
quality, and most attractive tax incentives. Thus, a furniture
company can sell sofas made with hardwoods that come from
Thailand one year and Malaysia the next, with engineered fiberboard filling in. The sofa’s heralded “Italian leather” may be
processed in Italy, but the hides come from Northern Europe—
or Argentina. The leather and the hardwoods may then travel
across the globe with assembly in the Ukraine or China or Vietnam as labor market conditions shift, and robots that can
substitute for the workers involved in riveting, shipping, or
warehouse supply. A brand such as “Natuzzi” may signal a
guarantee of quality, but its owners, employees, distribution
networks, and even corporate headquarters can shift over
14
time.
These two movements reinforce each other: the ideological
change contributed to a management focus on shorter-term and
more reductionist objectives while technological change and
globalization have created more opportunities for the flexible
and the nimble. Taken together, both change the relationships
between employers and employees, and both call into question
the use of the firm to supply basic necessities such as health
care and pensions, and to serve as suitable partners for public
purposes.
In this Article, we document the “death of the firm,” that
is, the ideological shift from celebration of the firm as bigger
13. Within the United States, these trends tend to focus on the movement
abroad. Jim Tankersley, America’s Top Execs Seem Ready To Give up on U.S.
Workers, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
storyline/wp/2014/09/11/americas-top-execs-seem-ready-to-give-up-on-u-s
-workers. For example, one study of Harvard Business School alumni, many of
whom are at the helm of major corporations, showed that fifty-six of those surveyed recounted instances of moving one thousand or more jobs abroad and
zero cases of moving that number of jobs from abroad into the United States.
Id. Jobs that move abroad, however, do not necessarily stay permanently in
the country to which the move occurs.
14. For an examination of these trends, see LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE
CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Gregory Elliott trans., 2007)
(discussing major changes in capitalist systems, including subdelegation). In
the nineties, Business Week heralded these developments as the rise of the
“virtual corporation,” which operated as a “network of independent companies—suppliers, customers, even erstwhile rivals—linked by information technology . . . [with] neither central office nor organization chart.” John Byrne,
The Virtual Corporation, BUS. WK. (Feb. 7, 1993), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/1993-02-07/the-virtual-corporation.
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than the sum of its parts to denigration of the firm as a “fiction”
that obscures analysis of the human interests at stake, and the
corresponding change from the large, stable corporations of the
industrial era to the more dynamic networks of the technological age. We argue that just as the State of the industrial era
grew in response to the concentrated power of manufacturing
firms so, too, must the State of the technological era complement and offset the new concentrations of power and better
equip workers to meet the challenges of the new era.
In Part I, we trace the rise of the corporation in America,
examining the changing relationships between management
and labor, and between firms and the State. This Part shows
how corporate theory, even as it develops over time, keeps coming back to the same issues: the challenges of changing labor
needs and the destructive tendencies of unchecked concentrations of power.
Part II explains the forces that have changed the ideological and material treatment of commercial production. This Part
describes the rise of the agency-cost theorists of the seventies,
the ideological assault they inspired on the idea of the firm, and
the changing impact of executive compensation and financial
markets on corporate objectives, culminating in the death of
the firm of the industrial era and the rise of more fluid corporate networks.
Part III examines the implications of these changed relationships—between labor and management, between corporations and government—for the treatment of the firm. Hobby
Lobby, in describing the corporation as no more than a vehicle
to advance other interests, changes the assumptions on which
public-private partnerships are based. Public subsidization of
employer-provided health care arose in an era in which secure
employment with a large employer was the norm. The recognition of the rights of owners to impose idiosyncratic limits on
employee access to state benefits raises the issue of whether
the State should subsidize employer benefits at all. Instead, the
logic of the decision suggests that the ultimate goal of health
care reform should be to eliminate the employer role altogether;
health care can be provided directly to individuals either
through exchanges that connect private companies with individuals or through a single-payer system. Employer-provided
health care has become an anachronism.
The latter portion of Part III analyzes what such recreation
of the relationship between State, firm, and individual might
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look like more generally. Unions—and the stable, wellcompensated employment contracts they championed—arose in
response to the nature of the firms of the industrial age. In an
era of commercial entities as networks that continually reform
in response to changing circumstances, the appropriate response may be to reconsider the sources of worker resilience
and autonomy. Just as Hobby Lobby’s owners are free to impose their religious values on the terms of corporate health
care, so too should Hobby Lobby’s employees be able to obtain
health care and other forms of social insurance on terms independent of their employment. The rebuilding of the terms of exchange in the information age should be reciprocal and empower individuals on both ends of these transactions to become
more nimble and adept players in a changing global marketplace.
As firms change from entities with stable identities, investments in long-term employees, and community-based
commitments to ever-shifting networks designed to maximize
15
the interests of the transient few, the opportunities they offer
for public-private partnerships change. The new partnerships
should be based on flexibility rather than stability, and they
should promote individual resilience rather than assume that
16
employment alone will address long-term worker needs. The
idea of the firm, at least at the height of the managerial era in
mid-twentieth-century America, assumed that business, employee, and public interests overlapped. In an era that dismisses firms as no more than vehicles to advance their owners’ narrowly defined or idiosyncratic interests, the sources of
individual flexibility and security also need to shift from within
to outside private business structures. While the holding of
Hobby Lobby is limited to closely held companies, its dictum is
far-reaching: it marks the end of the firm as an instrument of
collective well-being.

15. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 122–24 (describing the move toward more
transient employment); Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance in a
Networked Age, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 711, 713–15, 721–26 (2015).
16. For discussion of the idea of resilience, see Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J.
251, 269–73 (2010).
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I. THE RISE OF THE CORPORATION AND THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE MARKET
The one part of Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court in
Hobby Lobby that commands widespread agreement is the
statement that commercial entities are a means to an end ra17
ther than ends in themselves. Nonetheless, the debate about
the appropriate purposes of the firm is as old as the corporation
itself, and for some ends, the nature of a firm as an entity distinct from its owners is important.
The starting point for the discussion is straightforward.
Corporate form is an advantage in raising capital, and the ad18
vantages stem from the separation of ownership and control.
Legally, the corporation offers unlimited life, limited liability
both for the investor acquiring an equity share and the entrepreneur undertaking the commercial enterprise, and the ability
to transfer ownership of the shares and/or management of the
19
company without liquidating the enterprise. The growth of the
corporation was thus important for large, complex undertak20
ings, and quite different in important respects from partner21
ships or sole proprietorships.
The principal disadvantage of the corporation also comes
22
from the separation of ownership and control. Indeed, corporate form took hold more readily in the United States than the
United Kingdom perhaps because of the latter’s early, unhappy
23
experiences with corporate entities. Adam Smith wrote in The

17. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
18. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV.
387, 388–93 (2003) (arguing that the ability to lock in investors’ capital was
the primary advantage over other business forms).
19. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Contract or Concession? An Essay on the
History of Corporate Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 873, 885 (2000); Thomas S. Ulen, The
Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 320 (1993).
20. Blair, supra note 18, at 398–99.
21. Indeed, most businesses of all kinds were sole proprietorships or partnerships until at least the middle of the nineteenth century. David Millon,
Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1024 (2013).
22. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 435 (2000); see also 2 ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 741
(R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 1976).
23. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The
Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111
YALE L.J. 1, 24–25 (2001) (maintaining that the United States led in the dispersion of ownership and did so in part because of the capital needs of large
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Wealth of Nations that the directors of such companies, “being
the managers rather of other people’s money than of their
own,” cannot be expected to “watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery
frequently watch over their own. . . . Negligence and profusion,
24
therefore, must always prevail.” At their worst, corporations
can be “weapons” designed to exploit unwary investors or ex25
tend the reach of fraudulent schemes.
The basic advantage—capital accumulation—and the disadvantages that come from the separation of ownership and
control do not necessarily indicate very much about corporate
purpose or the role of an entity as a means to those ends. Instead, as the corporation took hold in the beginning of the
twentieth century, the major discussion concerned corporate
26
size. The rise of the industrial era marked the emergence of
27
large-scale organizations that coordinated human activity.
Economists, like Adam Smith, associated the creation of wealth
with specialization and trade; corporations brought that specialization in-house. John Kenneth Galbraith observed, however, that large organizations, which established prices and insured a demand for their products, were “enemies of the
28
market.” In the view that dominated discussion of the firm
from the beginning of the twentieth century through the end of
the 1970s, the essential role of the corporation lay in the role of
corporate size in creating distinctive advantages and risks. Understanding these advantages and the risks requires seeing the
corporation as an institution that stood apart from the interests

railroads); id. at 39–45 (discussing later developments in the United Kingdom).
24. SMITH, supra note 22.
25. Coffee, supra note 23, at 28 (noting that because of the risks of corruption, prominent underwriters refused until the end of the nineteenth century
to underwrite the common stock of industrial corporations); see also Stanton
Wheeler & Mitchell Lewis Rothman, The Organization as Weapon in WhiteCollar Crime, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1403, 1422–26 (1982) (“[P]ersons who commit
offenses under the aegis of an organization are able thereby to commit crimes
of greater sophistication, complexity, and magnitude.”).
26. See Donald J. Smythe, The Supreme Court and the Trusts: Antitrust
and the Foundations of Modern American Business Regulation from Knight to
Swift, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 91 (2005) (describing the interplay between
the growth of corporate size and antitrust regulation at the beginning of the
twentieth century).
27. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 40–41
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007) (1967).
28. Id. at 41. And, in Galbraith’s era, he meant “men.”
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of its stakeholders and had importance greater than the sum of
its parts.
A. CORPORATE IDENTITY AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE PRICE
MECHANISM
The idea of the firm as an entity greater than the sum of
its parts has long been accepted as a defining feature of capitalism. In 1991, Ronald Coase received the Nobel Prize in Economics, with one of his two major contributions to the field en29
titled The Nature of the Firm. His role in the corporate debate
serves as a touchstone both for understanding the industrial
age corporation at its height and as an inspiration for the information age theorists who would dismantle it. He wrote initially as a graduate student in the 1930s in an effort to provide
an economic explanation for the increasing size of organizations. The paper was largely ignored for the next thirty years,
and then rose to prominence less as an explanation for the
phenomena Coase sought to explain than as an agent of its de30
struction. The key to the paper’s influence may well be its
brevity. Coase would say in his Nobel Prize acceptance lecture
that that his work has been criticized for its failure to “operationalize” its core insights, that is, to define the variables that
underlie transaction cost economics in a way that allows them
31
to be quantified and empirically tested. That “failure” may
well be the secret of his success: subsequent scholars can read
into the work the interpretations that advance their own theories. We will do the same and argue that Coase’s critical insight
about the role of firms fits comfortably with explanations of
large corporations at the height of their influence and the intellectual developments that mark their decline. “Operationalizing Coase” thus means identifying what role the suppression of
the price mechanism, the factor he most identifies with the nature of the firm, plays as that role changes over time. While we
make no pretense of engaging in formal economic modeling, we
do emphasize the importance of singling out the factors that

29. Coase, supra note 2. To be sure, Coase was influenced by other economists. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (Univ. of
Chicago Press, Midway Reprint ed. 1985) (1921).
30. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business
Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA L. REV. 863, 869 (2010) (describing Coase’s impact).
31. Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in NOBEL
LECTURES IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES: 1991–1995, at 11, 18–19 (Torsten Persson
ed., World Scientific Publ’g Co. 1997).
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explain the rise of large business entities at their height and
their more recent decline.
In his initial article, Coase argued that the rise of the large
corporation should be treated as an economic mystery. Economists after all celebrated the price mechanism, that is, Adam
Smith’s unseen hand coordinating the supply of goods and services in accordance with market exchanges, as the hallmark of
efficiency. Yet, Coase observed that “the distinguishing mark of
32
the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism.” Given
that economists posited that production did not require any organization at all, why did the firm arise and, indeed, why had
large firms become so central to economic production?
To provide an answer, Coase framed the question in terms
of a comparison between the advantages of the market and use
of the price mechanism versus those of a command and control
system where the entrepreneur owner could simply order the
33
result. His description of the alternatives—market transactions or command and control—is remarkably thin. Coase describes the character of a contract internal to the firm as one
whereby “the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be
fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entre34
preneur within certain limits.” This description almost certainly reflects two influences. The first is the contrast between
capitalist markets and socialist economies and it contains a
measure of irony. Coase begins the article observing that
“[t]hose who object to economic planning on the grounds that
the problem is solved by price movements can be answered by
pointing out that there is planning within our economic system
. . . which is akin to what is normally called economic plan35
ning.” This “economic planning” is the boss telling his employ36
ees what to do.
Second, the dominant management model of the era was
“Fordism,” modeled after Henry Ford’s use of the assembly

32. Coase, supra note 2, at 389.
33. Id. at 390.
34. Id. at 391 (emphasis omitted). Coase italicized the words “within certain limits” and added in a footnote that “[i]t would be possible for no limits to
the powers of the entrepreneur to be fixed. This would be voluntary slavery.”
Id. at 391, 391 n.2.
35. Id. at 387–88.
36. Coase explains, “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is
ordered to do so.” Id. at 387.
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37

line. As a more general term, Fordism has been defined in
terms of the separation of conception from execution, the substitution of skilled workers with unskilled workers, and the use
of universal machinery to produce one product for mass mar38
kets. As a management principle (often called “Taylorism”),
the idea required management control over labor in the name
39
of efficiency. While Coase does not discuss management theories per se, he viewed management’s ability to direct labor as
definitional. He accordingly wrote that what constitutes a firm
in practice is tied to the legal relationship between employer
and employee (or “master and servant”) and that legal relationship involves the duty of the servant to render personal services to the master and the master’s right to control the serv40
ant’s work. Indeed, the employer’s ability to tell the employee
when to work, what work to do, and how to do it becomes “the
dominant characteristic in this relation and marks off the serv41
ant from an independent contractor” as a matter of law.
In considering the value of the firm, Coase stresses the
need to deal with uncertainty and (as always for Coase) trans42
action costs. In this model, the critical role of the firm then
becomes its ability to serve as an alternative to the price mechanism. To the extent that the use of markets has a high price,
perhaps because of the unpredictability of future events, the
43
firm gives the entrepreneur greater flexibility. The value of
Coase’s insight, however, does not lie with his specification of
how a firm organizes any particular activity; instead, it is the

37. Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Putting Worker-Management Relations in
Context: Why Employee Representational Choice Needs Greater Protection in
Reform of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 59 (1997).
38. CHARLES F. SABEL, WORK AND POLITICS: THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN
INDUSTRY 32–33, 194–95 (1982).
39. These ideas are closely associated with Frederick W. Taylor. See, e.g.,
Frederick W. Taylor, Shop Management, in SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 17, 98–
99 (Frederick Winslow Taylor ed. 1947) (“All possible brain work should be
removed from the shop and centered in the planning or laying-out department.”). For an evaluation of Taylor’s impact, see HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR
AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 90 (1974) (emphasizing the importance of Taylor’s principles as a
management tool in gaining nearly absolute control over the labor process).
40. Coase, supra note 2, at 403–04.
41. Id. at 404 (citing FRANCIS R. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
6 (1933)).
42. Id. at 394–95, 400–03.
43. Id. at 391 (noting that the longer the contract term, the harder it becomes to specify what needs to be done).
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contrast between market and non-market transactions and the
startling conclusion, at least for an economist, that even in the
44
productive realm, non-market organization may be superior.
Coase’s conclusion suggested that the firm as an entity might
have some importance.
B. THE INDUSTRIAL ERA AND THE ADVANTAGES OF THE FIRM
Coase tried in the thirties to create a schema that could
predict when a firm would find it more useful to bring activities
in-house rather than contract for the same goods and services
on the market. His answer—when the advantages of command
and control outweighed the market—did not give much insight
45
into the forces that produced the advantages he described.
Two other bodies of work go into those advantages in much
greater detail: those describing the coordination of labor within
firms and those describing a large enterprise’s advantages in
addressing external conditions. The description of the former
comes from John Kenneth Galbraith’s work on The New Indus46
trial State in the 1960s.
The rise of large organizations in the twentieth century
marked the rise of what Max Weber termed “bureaucracy,”
47
both within government and within business enterprises. Like
Coase, he assigned considerable credit to hierarchy—to the cre48
ation of a command structure that coordinated activities. Weber, however, gave considerably more weight to the idea of ex49
pertise and to the association of authority with that expertise.

44. Indeed, Coase addresses only the classical notion of efficiency in the
production of goods and services. See, e.g., id. at 394, 398–99.
45. See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 402–03 nn.33–34 (2007) (noting that
“[t]ransaction cost methodology requires the evaluation of relative costs” but
that “[t]ransaction costs are not consistently defined in the literature”); Oliver
E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3–4
(2005).
46. GALBRAITH, supra note 27.
47. See 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956–63 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1968) (1922). Weber also noted a number of the dark sides
of bureaucracy, such as reduced transparency—which permitted those with
expertise to maintain the power that accompanies specialized expertise. See,
e.g., Louis M. Imbeau, Transparency in the Budget Process of a Bureaucratic
Organisation: A Principal-Agent Model of Budgeting, in THE ECONOMICS OF
TRANSPARENCY IN POLITICS 189, 189–90 (Albert Breton et al. eds., 2007) (discussing Weber’s views on the danger of expertise).
48. See 2 WEBER, supra note 47.
49. See id.
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Galbraith’s work three decades later explained how the two
came together as the hallmark of large corporations. In Galbraith’s model, the individual entrepreneur and the all50
powerful executive disappear. Institutions, with large companies primary among them, had become more important than
the individuals who direct them, and the connections between
the company and its top officers central to the coordination of
technocratic enterprises.
Modern media theory, when applied to organizational behavior, describes institutions as supplying an identity associated with a firm that in turn commands loyalty from those who
51
embrace the identity. Economists George Akerlof and Rachel
Kranton used this idea of identity to examine the ability of a
firm to create employee identification with firm objectives and
52
values. Workers who think of themselves as insiders rather
than outsiders require less in the way of extra compensation to
produce desired results and become less likely to game the
53
compensation system that does exist. Moreover, group cohesion increases feelings of loyalty and reduces turnover. Akerlof
and Kranton concluded that “[w]orker identification may therefore be a major factor, perhaps even the dominant factor, in the
54
success or failure of organizations.”
Galbraith’s account of the corporation at mid-twentiethcentury made the same point in explaining corporate success at
the height of the manufacturing era. Written at a point almost
equidistant between Coase and Akerlof and Kranton, Galbraith
found that the principal problem for any organization is how to
55
coordinate the activities of members. Doing so requires addressing the issue of motivation. Like Akerlof and Kranton, he
found that neither compulsion nor pecuniary incentives were
56
enough. Instead, the most effective motivation comes from

50. See GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 115–22.
51. See, e.g., DONALD HISLOP, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS 230 (2013) (describing how the most effective way to deal with problems
such as employee turnover is to develop institutional identity and employee
loyalty and observing that institutional identity that encourages employees to
identify with firm objectives creates stronger loyalty than instrumental
measures such as merit pay or bonuses).
52. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS:
HOW OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 59 (2010).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 176–85.
56. Ironically, given the later emphasis on agency costs, Galbraith ob-
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employees who identify with the goals of the firm and derive
tremendous satisfaction from achieving them or, short of that,
who partially identify with the firm’s objectives and hope to be
57
able to influence them in a direction more to their liking. In
short, Galbraith, too, believed in “identity economics” and
found the firm as entity central to the creation of identity.
Galbraith nevertheless distinguished among different
groups associated with companies. He maintained that identification with the company affected the productivity of all employees, though the effect was likely to be least pronounced
among the less skilled. Still, the individual worker came to
think of himself as “an IBM man, a Corning Glass man or a
58
Sears man.” He observed further:
Next, as one moves inward, are foremen and supervisory personnel
and the clerical, sales and other routine white collar personnel. These
merge at their inner perimeter with technicians, engineers, sales executives, scientists, designers and other specialists who comprise the
technostructure. Beyond these at the center are the executives or
management. As one moves through these inner circles, identification
59
and adaptation become increasingly important.

In other words, as employees move up the corporate ladder, positions require greater expertise and judgment; as the opportunity for discretionary judgment increases, the difficulty of
specifying outcomes grows and the importance of motivation
increases. Identity—with the corporation and with a professional role—supplies a significant portion of that motivation.
Within this schema, Galbraith identified shareholders as
those most motivated by monetary incentives—and least interested in the health of the company beyond what might be a
60
very limited investment. In contrast, corporate officers of the

served that compulsion produced the highest cost to the firm in terms of oversight and monitoring and pecuniary incentives, such as bonuses tied to production goals, provided little basis for loyalty and, as Akerlof and Kranton
would later observe, incentives to game the system, requiring that much
greater oversight in turn. See id. at 164–67. For a fuller discussion, see
Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: Corporate
Governance Reform in Context, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001, 1040.
57. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 207–22.
58. Id. at 188. Akerlof and Kranton add that employees, like enlisted personnel in the military, may identify more with their unit than with the enterprise more generally, but that the unit identification can also be a strong
source of motivation. AKERLOF & KRANTON, supra note 52, at 56–57.
59. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 152–53.
60. Id. at 150–51. For a more complex account of shareholder interests,
however, see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
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postwar era tended to see their role as one of company stewards
who linked particular company objectives to technocratic norms
that made the quality of their stewardship an indication of pro61
fessional standing. Galbraith observed that while corporate
officers often did own stock or stock options, and while they often had access to information from which they could personally
benefit, they rarely acted to advance their individual pecuniary
interests at the expense of the firm—or their professional
62
standing. Instead, “[p]ower passe[d] down into the organiza63
tion,” and acting on self-interest was just not what “a good
64
company man” did.
Galbraith attributed the strength of the ethos to group de65
cision-making and identification. Indeed, he asserted that the
prevalence of group, rather than individual, action “is a striking characteristic of management organization in the large cor66
poration.” Galbraith even defended the committee. Committees were necessary, in part, because the complexity of the
67
corporation required broad input. With group sessions, the individual’s actions, reasoning, and behavior were subject to
68
scrutiny. Individuals were expected to live up to a high level of
personal honesty, and they benefitted as part of a group, rather
than as individuals competing against each other for promotions or bonuses. Pay levels, whether generous or not, did not

SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012).
61. Harwell Wells notes that this idea of stewardship even had a place in
the Harvard Business School’s conception of the Managerial Role. Harwell
Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and
the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 305, 323–24 (2013).
62. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 146–48.
63. Id. at 147.
64. Id. at 147–48.
65. Galbraith wrote:
Thus decision in the modern business enterprise is the product not of
individuals but of groups. The groups are numerous, as often informal
as formal, and subject to constant change in composition. Each contains the men possessed of the information, or with access to the information, that bears on the particular decision together with those
whose skill consists in extracting and testing this information and obtaining a conclusion.
Id. at 80.
66. Id. at 73 (citation omitted).
67. See id. (citing JUSTIN G. LONGNECKER, PRINCIPLES OF MANAGEMENT
AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 263 (Charles E. Merrill, 3d ed. 1973)).
68. Id. at 78.
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69

vary with firm profits and the CEO’s income, which was not
that much higher than that of other senior management officials, paled in comparison with the compensation levels of the
70
twenties or today. Galbraith concluded that business enterprise in “modern economic society” could “only be understood as
an effort, wholly successful, to synthesize by organization a
group personality far superior for its purposes to a natural per71
son”—and it had the advantage of immortality to boot.
To be sure, the advantages of this system did not come
solely from the strength of individual corporate identities. Instead, it came from the combination of firm stewardship with
something Galbraith called the “technostructure.” This
technostructure included “all who bring specialized knowledge,
72
talent or experience to group decision-making.” This group,
with its shared ethos and commitment to technocratic management, rather than top corporate officials per se, constituted
73
“the guiding intelligence—the brain—of the enterprise.” While
these corporate groups did bring different perspectives and
types of expertise to bear on individual decisions, they also created reinforcing cycles that deepened identification with the
firm. Charles O’Kelley explained: “Thus, decisions are made in
order to enhance the ability of technocrats to identify with the
firm, to reward team members who are able to further the goals
of the technocracy, and, if possible, to subtly and incrementally
74
adapt the corporation to the CEO’s own values.”
This notion of scientific management had its limitations.
The group did not necessarily seek to maximize short-term cor75
porate profits. Instead, with closer management identification
with the firm itself, the first order of the day was the survival
76
of the corporation. Safe and dependable earnings expansion
served that end better than risks, which, however much they
promised exceptional returns, could also produce catastrophic
losses. In addition, this group, confident in its own judgment,
69. Id. at 147.
70. See id. at 138–39 (discussing how lower executive pay tracks to a
commitment to the success of the corporation over self-interest); O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1022, 1046 (discussing the relatively high pay of CEOs in the
twenties and today compared to that of their employees).
71. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 74.
72. Id. at 88.
73. Id.
74. O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1042.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1041.
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77

sought to insure its own autonomy. CEOs did not have dicta78
torial power in an era of management by committee, but they
did enjoy considerable independence from shareholders, who
remained more broadly dispersed than today’s institutional in79
vestors, and from other outside actors.
In this system, the firm did become more important than
the individual. Few would confuse the world dominated by behemoths like General Motors, International Business Machines
Corporation (IBM), or Ma Bell with entrepreneur-run enterprises such as Ford or Standard Oil of a half century earlier, or
the Steve Jobs–run Apple or Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook of
more recent times. And with longer worker tenure in both the
senior management and production ranks, corporate officers
identified their own success and well-being far more with the
health and prestige of their companies than with their individual bank accounts. It therefore made sense to bring activities
inside the firm to the extent that this technocratic motivation,
which came from the combination of firm and professional identity, provided greater advantages than from more contingent
arrangements. And with greater firm investment in workers
and a correspondingly greater commitment to worker tenure,
employment became a foundation for individual security and
80
employee well-being. One way of “operationalizing” Coase
therefore becomes the calculus: When does identification with
firm objectives and ethos offer advantages that outweigh the
81
costs of commitment to a long-term workforce?
As firms grew, however, and their size in itself contributed
to the impact of these behemoth firms, primary among the ef-

77. See id.
78. See GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 70. These limits on the CEO came
from the CEO’s need to defer to those with superior technical expertise. Id. at
72.
79. See O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1002–03.
80. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, 53
TULANE L. REV. 697, 701–02 (1979) (“[A]n inference is justified that arbitrators have both sensed and contributed to the heightened importance of the job
relationship as a focal point of security and standing in society . . . .”).
81. The answer, of course, depends in part on whether the labor market is
tight or slack, and partly on whether the benefits of firm identity and corresponding worker loyalty justify a commitment to long-term stability in employment. For a discussion of the propriety of loyalty in the absence of employer commitment to employees, see David W. Hart & Jeffery A. Thompson,
Untangling Employee Loyalty: A Psychological Contract, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q.
297 (2007).
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fects was greater insulation from market pressures. This produced a different body of analysis, emphasizing the risks as
well as the advantages to the public of large organizations.
C. THE RISKS OF LARGE ORGANIZATIONS
Coase, in identifying the advantages of firms, mentioned
several kinds of effects. The first was the ability to command
employees, but the second involved the ability to plan free from
82
immediate market pressures. Galbraith also mentioned the
advantages large firms have to set prices (often with the tacit
agreement of other firms) and to create demand (often through
83
product design, packaging, and advertising). For much of the
twentieth century, debate about corporations involved debate
about their insulation from market forces, not to achieve competitive advantages in planning for uncertain future events,
but in order to acquire greater control over the events them84
selves. Another way to operationalize Coase suggests that
firms continue to grow in size so long as the contribution of
greater size to their ability to control events does not outweigh
the costs. Stated in these terms, size becomes connected to po85
litical and market power rather than production efficiencies.
With increased growth, corporations became more powerful. The largest corporations of the industrial era tended either
to be part of cartels such as big steel, big auto, and big oil, or
heavily regulated utilities, such as General Electric (GE) and
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T). The
sheer size of the institutions increased their political clout and
82. See Coase, supra note 2, at 390–92.
83. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 251–54, 319.
84. Harwell Wells summarized these observations:
[Corporations] were unique not just because of their size, but because
they were competing in oligopolistic or highly regulated markets and
were insulated from intensive competitive pressures. Capable of generating capital internally, they also were independent of capital markets. Buffered from external controls, the largest firms resembled independent states: they could command an army of employees,
determine what to produce, set prices, direct scientific progress, decide which communities received new investment, and even set the
rate of capital expansion.
C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 102
(2002).
85. See Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Berle and Veblen: An Intellectual Connection, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317, 1339–40 (2011) (quoting THORSTEIN
VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES:
THE CASE OF AMERICA 220 (A.M. Kelley 1964) (1923)).
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their impact on the communities in which they were located.
General Motors layoffs could devastate Detroit, and wiping out
a class of shareholders—often employees without diversified
portfolios—could create ripple effects throughout affected com86
munities. The initial responses at the turn of the twentieth
87
century addressed the power size conferred. The growing influence of monopolies and cartels spurred antitrust measures
with the aim of recreating competitive markets, and justified
the creation of a more powerful State capable of countering the
88
growth of private power. In the 1930s, concern about corporate power took a different direction, focusing on the changing
nature of the firm itself. This commentary critiqued the separation of ownership and control as the hallmark of large corporations, and the increasing impact of large corporations not just
on business arrangements, but on important aspects of the
89
lives of the communities they affected. Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means’s magisterial volume, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, published in 1932, called corporate managers of this era “princes of industry” and likened their power
90
to the overseer of a principality.
Berle and Means argued that, by the Great Depression, the
corporation as entity had taken on a significance that made it
something more than the tools of its owners. They maintained
that the corporations of the era oversaw economic empires that
aggregated capital from widely dispersed sources and used it to
91
create complex, unaccountable enterprises. Taking together
86. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORAPRIVATE PROPERTY 306 (1932) (noting that the “great associations”
of the industrial age “are so different from the small, privately owned enterprises of the past as to make the concept of private enterprise an ineffective
instrument of analysis”).
87. See Wells, supra note 61, at 316–17 (emphasizing the role of oligopolistic concentration in increasing firm power).
88. See HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 374 (1909) (advocating for the need to break up monopolies through legal and political
means due to their threat to “any thoroughly democratic and constructive system of municipal economy”).
89. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 5 (noting, however, that many corporations were not necessarily geographically bound).
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id. at 4–5. Berle observed that corporate managers obtained greater
independence not just from shareholders, but also from creditors. By restricting stock dividends, the managers could generate additional cash internally
for new investments, limiting their dependence on creditors as well. See
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 35–41
(1954).
TION AND
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the corporation’s impact on its shareholders, employees, and
the communities it affected, Berle and Means concluded that
corporations had become “quasi-public” entities akin to principalities that affected, in one way or another, every household in
92
America.
In discussing the separation of ownership and control,
Berle and Means raised two different types of issues. The first
involved the ability of a control bloc of shareholders to fleece
93
other shareholders. In the decade that preceded Berle and
Means’s book, stock ownership had increased dramatically,
with the stock market boom of the twenties fueled in part by
the increased participation of small investors. These investors
often had limited voting rights and less control over corporate
94
policies. Moreover, during the same period, corporate executives often commanded outsized salaries with minimal disclo95
sure or accountability. Indeed, one commentator of the period
observed that “the fat boys, no longer content with their ancient perquisite of milking the public, are now engaged in the
96
dizzy and lofty job of squeezing their own shareholders dry!”
Concern that managers, who were often controlling shareholders, served to advance their own ends at the expense of other
shareholders was widely shared, and thought to be one of the
97
principal causes of the Great Depression.
The second concern had to do with the impact of large corporations on communities. Large industrial firms depended on
98
established supply chains and a large supply of workers. This
92. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 4.
93. See id. at 128–218 (arguing that, because the law had gradually reduced the rights of shareholders, it was questionable whether they could be
termed owners at all).
94. Indeed, Berle and Means devoted nearly a hundred pages to detailing
the legal changes that gave shareholders less corporate power. Id.
95. See, e.g., Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”:
The Fight over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV.
689, 707–08 (2010).
96. Stuart Chase, Professor Quixote, THE NATION, Mar. 9, 1927, at 264.
97. Berle and Means commented further that:
The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a giant corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a
multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of
trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The organizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm of
private enterprise—they have become more nearly social institutions.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 46.
98. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009)
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in turn made such companies vulnerable to labor or supply
99
chain disruptions. A major source of the uncertainty Coase
described involved insuring that supplies and workers would be
available when needed. A solution was the creation of ever100
larger, vertically integrated entities. Berle explained that by
the time of the early thirties, 200 corporations had amassed
wealth equal to almost half the industrial assets of the country,
and the profits generated by these companies had an effect
101
through their shareholders on perhaps half of the country.
The larger the entities, however, the greater their power and
potential impact on the communities in which they were located, and hence the greater the potential disruptive effects from
102
the wrong-doing Berle and Means described. Moreover, the
change from entrepreneurial firms to firms characterized by
the separation of ownership and control also meant that com103
munity norms had less impact on owners and managers. An
entrepreneurial owner, for example, might find that if he
fleeced his customers, mistreated his employees, or sold shoddy
products, his personal standing in the community would
104
drop. Management committees or a control bloc of sharehold(summarizing literature that describes vertical integration as a response to
firm dependence on supply chains and observing that modern innovative firms
no longer follow the same patterns).
99. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal routinely writes articles today explaining the difficulty manufacturing companies have in locating such plants
in the United States because of the difficulties of reestablishing supply chains
and skilled labor forces. See, e.g., James R. Hagerty, For U.S. Manufacturing,
Opportunities and Challenges, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/for-u-s-manufacturing-opportunities-and-challenges-1433300938 (emphasizing trained workers, infrastructure, and supply chains); Ted Mann, Otis
Finds ‘Reshoring’ Manufacturing Is Not Easy, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023045187045795194329465744
24; see also Mark Muro, Reshoring: Strong Regions Will Determine Where,
How, BROOKINGS: THE AVENUE (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blog/
the-avenue/2014/10/02/reshoring-strong-regions-will-determine-where-how.
100. See Gilson et al., supra note 98, at 438–39 (describing industries for
which vertical integration was initially seen as a superior model).
101. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Note, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees:
A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1368 n.8 (1932).
102. See Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1247, 1290 (2010) (citing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 352).
103. See Berle, supra note 101, at 1367–68 (suggesting that, in systems
that emphasize individual ownership, managers are subject neither to market
discipline nor community norms).
104. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153 (1932) (arguing that a changing public attitude about a business’s obligations to the community will lead to changed behavior in managers).
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ers, on the other hand, were often relatively anonymous and
their membership could change over time, making them that
much less accountable to anyone.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, breaking up
these concentrations of power was the preferred solution. Berle
and Means instead sought to tame them. In their view, this increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of a relatively
few, unaccountable entities rendered “the corporation an organization with an impact comparable to the medieval church or
105
the modern state.” They concluded that the power of the
modern corporation and the unaccountability of its managers
“placed the community in a position to demand that the modern
corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all so106
ciety.”
D. THE TAMING OF CORPORATE POWER
Berle and Means, who emphasized the problems stemming
from the separation of ownership and control, have defined the
corporate governance debate ever since. Ironically, they remain
iconic figures in the area where their work hit an inescapable
dead end: the private law that governs the relationships among
corporate stakeholders. They have been less influential in the
arena they most sought to influence at the time: the role of
State and community in offsetting the accumulation of corpo107
rate power. To operationalize Berle the corporate scholar and
Berle and Means collectively requires asking the question: As
the nature of corporate power shifts, what measures become
necessary to protect the interests of other stakeholders, that is,
how can parity be restored among business, labor, and community interests?
To answer the question requires separating the two issues
Berle and Means identified: the use of corporate structure to
enrich a control bloc at the expense of customers, workers, and
other shareholders; and the use of corporate structure to advance the interests of corporate actors at the expense of the
larger community. The classic debate between Berle and law
professor E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the pages of the Harvard Law
Review explains the dilemma for systems of private govern-

105. Wells, supra note 102, at 1290.
106. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 312.
107. Cf. Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond
Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19, 20 (1988).
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ance. Berle, concerned about unaccountable control blocs victimizing other shareholders, argued for stronger fiduciary duties by corporate officers and directors to maximize shareholder
108
wealth. In 1932, Dodd, more concerned about corporate community obligations, challenged the idea that stockholders
should be the “sole beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise,”
109
preferring broader duties to multiple stakeholders. Berle objected that the problem was that the “relatively unbridled scope
of corporate management has, to date, brought forward in the
main seizure of power without recognition of responsibility—
110
ambition without courage.” To allow corporate managers to
focus solely on corporate earnings might shortchange community interests, but to allow corporate managers to advance a
broader array of interests meant, as a practical matter, that
they would be subject to no legally enforceable standards at
111
all. In short, corporate law, limited to private enforcement of
private obligations, offered no real answer to the full set of
112
challenges corporate power posed.
Ultimately, what changed the exercise of corporate power
was less a shift in corporate governance or a change in fiduciary duties, than factors extrinsic to the corporation itself. These
changes ultimately tamed the unaccountable exercise of corporate power as the corporations themselves retained and even
expanded their dominant position in economic life. Thus, Berle
and Means wrote that the increasing power of corporations
gave rise to increasing public sentiment that those exercising
corporate power “accept responsibility for the well-being of
those subject to the organization, whether workers, investors,
113
or consumers.” The obligation to others came from the fact of
corporate power, and corporate power came from corporate in108. See Berle, supra note 101, at 1367–68.
109. Dodd, supra note 104, at 1147–48.
110. Berle, supra note 101, at 1370.
111. Id. at 1367–68.
112. See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (arguing that
shareholder wealth maximization may be the best rule of corporate governance because “a stakeholder measure of managerial accountability could leave
managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their own
agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer,
nor national wealth, but only their own”); cf. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 792–
93 (arguing that the Hobby Lobby owners are free to pursue their own definitions of corporate interest because they should not be limited to narrow requirements to maximize corporate or shareholder wealth).
113. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 310.
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sulation from competitive forces and outside control. This insulation would, at the height of the managerial era, give corporate managers the latitude to advance a broader set of inter114
ests. The more interesting question is why they did so.
The conventional wisdom has three overlapping components. First, mid-nineteenth century scholars, Galbraith notably among them, argued that that “countervailing powers,”
principally unions and the State, limited corporate freedom of
115
action. Galbraith thus argued that the very power of corpora116
tions encouraged the organization of opposition.
Take unions, for example. In accordance with Galbraith’s
analysis, corporate power both encouraged and made possible
union power. The very dominance of large employers encouraged organizing efforts to target them. The insulation of these
employers from competitive markets allowed their managers to
engineer union settlements and, as Dodd had argued in the
thirties, increased public pressure on them to do so. Moreover,
postwar corporations, insulated from greater competition, also
decided that a labor truce—and higher worker compensation—
117
created greater demand for corporate products. Given the size
of the unionized plants, the labor rights won in these actions
influenced wages and benefits more generally as the unionized
118
plants played an outsized role in the labor market. Union vic119
tories in turn reduced employee turnover and union organiza-

114. Cf. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 207–08, 221–22 (noting that the
“mature corporation . . . identifies itself with goals which have, or appear to
. . . have, social purpose”); Wells, supra note 61 (discussing the evolution of
corporate social power).
115. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 196–200 (1952).
116. See id.
117. Wells observed that:
By the end of that decade, though, the endemic struggle between capital and labor was replaced, at least in the public eye, by a labormanagement concordat in which corporate managers were left to run
their businesses as they saw fit, and, in return, labor unions received
income and benefits sufficient to carry their members into the middle
class.
Wells, supra note 61, at 322.
118. See John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1105 (2011) (maintaining that these reinforcing effects work well in a slack economy, but have destabilizing inflationary tendencies over time).
119. Union victories both made it harder to fire employees and made jobs
more attractive as they provided benefits, raises, and other advantages that
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tion, as it created more cohesive worker groups, also had the
effect of reinforcing employee identification with the compa120
ny. Union and management interests, both tied to large organizations, became somewhat less antagonistic.
Second, the State, which increased in power along with
corporations, used regulation of institutions to advance state
interests. In the process, the institution itself became important to the vindication of public purposes. Galbraith certainly recognized, for example, that large corporations did not nec121
essarily welcome union organizers and federal labor relations
laws promoting union organization and collective bargaining
may have been “the most critical, controversial, and divisive
manifestation of governmental intervention to promote coun122
tervailing power.” Other federal laws, perhaps most notably
the Civil Rights Era employment discrimination statutes, used
the regulation of hiring practices in large, private organizations
to model country-wide expectations about appropriate behavior.
Individuals could choose to discriminate; organizations, particularly large organizations, could not.
The State and large private organizations began to provide
societal benefits in parallel ways. The New Deal initiation of
social security benefits marked a major expansion of the role of
123
the State in providing a social safety net. Still, the expansion
of private pensions, particularly those supplied by large corporations, established a broad-based complementary system as an
124
incentive to stay with a single employer. Larger corporations
provided more pension security, and pension benefits further
cemented the importance of firms as institutions with longerincreased with seniority. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 47 MINN. L. REV. 505, 505–06 (1963).
120. See Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests,
Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 952 (1992).
121. See Cioffi, supra note 118, at 1102–03 (noting the contradictions in
Galbraith’s analysis as he simultaneously suggests that countervailing powers
arise spontaneously and that their effectiveness may depend on government
intervention).
122. Id. at 1103–04.
123. See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1124 (1997) (“[O]ut of 6.5 million people over age sixtyfive in the United States [in the thirties], only 150,000 aged people were receiving ‘industrial and trade-union pensions,’ with possibly an equal number
receiving veterans’ or public retirement system pensions.”).
124. See id. at 1117.
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term time horizons and a larger significance to the lives of their
employees.
This role of large institutions in remaking communities
perhaps reached its height with health care. The United States,
unlike most of the developed world, did not build a public system of universal health insurance in part because of its reliance
on the private employment system to do so. Many scholars view
the reliance on private plans as an accident of timing—the public pressure to establish universal insurance came as employers
embraced private benefits as a way around the price controls
125
established during World War II. The ubiquity of larger employers made it possible to envision widespread health coverage
with only limited public provision for the elderly and the poor.
Large corporations within this system collectively performed
societal roles that did not depend on the individual missions of
particular firms.
Third, corporate managers, at least during the period that
ran from the forties through the seventies, did take a broader
126
view of corporate interests. Here, however, the law’s most
127
important contribution may have been to stay out of the way.
A New Jersey decision in the fifties concluded that corporate
managers were free to make charitable contributions where
they could show the “gift tends reasonably to promote the good128
will of the business of the contributing corporation.” Other
decisions gave greater weight to shareholder interests. Most
decisions, however, acknowledged the directors’ fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders, and as a practical matter gave corporate managers a wide berth. Dodd’s view
129
in the debate with Berle appeared to have prevailed.
125. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan Monheit, Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform 3 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14839, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1373348 (“The link between employment and private health insurance was strengthened during World War II when in 1943
the War Labor Board ruled that controls over wages and prices imposed by the
1942 Stabilization Act did not apply to fringe benefits such as health insurance.”).
126. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 191–94.
127. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 61, at 311–12 (concluding that the different
eras of corporate theory had little impact on corporate legal developments).
128. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 585 (N.J. 1953) (citation
omitted).
129. But then Berle changed his position over the course of his lifetime as
well. For a summary of these developments, see Wells, supra note 61. In contrast, corporate scholars at the turn of the twenty-first century were hailing
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E. THE PINNACLE OF FIRM PROMINENCE
The idea of the firm that reigned from the beginning of the
twentieth century through the 1970s was neither constant nor
reified into a fixed legal construct. Instead, it encompassed two
notions that ran through these decades. Both involve the ideas
of institutions as greater than individuals and more than the
sum of their parts. These ideas add content to Coase’s notion of
the firm as a device that suppresses the price mechanism and
does so as a way to coordinate human behavior.
The first idea is the role of identity and loyalty in coordinating behavior within the firm. With the rise of great corporations, the individual entrepreneurs, the Henry Fords or the
130
John D. Rockefellers, faded in importance. In their place, less
recognizable, and perhaps more fungible, corporate managers
embraced the corporate brand and saw their role as one of
131
stewardship of the institution. This stewardship made the
company’s well-being a hallmark of professional success, and
encouraged alignment of individual and corporate values. The
individual gained personal status through identification with
the firm and saw the firm’s well-being as intimately linked
132
with personal advancement. As modern researchers show,
this conception of the firm provides a better motivator for employee efforts than monetary rewards, and makes it easier to
coordinate management efforts than more competitive man133
agement systems. This strong conception of firm identity,
however, also tends to be an obstacle to more radical restructuring of firm mission or structure.
This alignment between firm identity and employee motivation, of course, can exist within any enterprise. The extent to
which it characterizes the employment relationship depends on
bonds of reciprocity. Firm commitment to employees—through
training, opportunities for promotion, secure tenure, and bene-

the triumph of shareholder supremacy. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439
(2001).
130. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 115–19.
131. See id. at 122.
132. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS
MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 169 (2011) (describing how firms influence team unity
and bonding by encouraging loyalty to the firm).
133. See, e.g., Michael E. Murphy, Dispelling Tina’s Ghost from the PostEnron Corporate Governance Debate, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 105 (2002).
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134

fits—encourages greater identification and loyalty. On the
other hand, temporary, routine, or changing activities may be
better supplied through the arm’s length market transactions.
The balance between internal and external activities is a
135
changing one.
The second role of the large firm came with the coordination of external and internal obligations. This, too, involved
bonds of reciprocity. Large firms benefitted most from the suppression of the price mechanism not with respect to their internal operations, but from the ability to limit competition from
136
rivals. Thus, Berle and Means and a host of reformers in the
early part of the century emphasized the unaccountability that
came from oligopolistic industries and the dispersion of shareholders that left managers free to increase their salaries, risk
other people’s money, and fleece the firm’s various constitu137
ents. These very same traits—relative freedom from competitive pressures and from narrow wealth maximization objectives—contributed to the managerial era that reached its
138
height in the postwar era. In this period, managerial utility,
in the form of personal professional standing and satisfaction,
came from the identification of firm well-being with technocratic management. Managers—from CEOs to foremen—derived a
greater part of their personal standing from identification with
the firm and they identified the firm’s well-being less with the
short-term bottom line and more with professional standards
139
and societal objectives.
In this context, the relationship between external constraints, such as unions and insulation, and external pressures,
such as market competition, operated in tandem. Managerial
inclination to recognize multiple constituencies was possible in
large part because of insulation from external threats. None-

134. See, e.g., Mats Alvesson, Social Identity and the Problem of Loyalty in
Knowledge-Intensive Companies, 37 J. MGMT. STUD. 1101, 1111–15 (2000).
135. For discussion of the changing nature of these calculations, see
BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 63 (discussing the continuing role
of non-monetary incentives in motivating employees); id. at 224–29 (describing
the casualization of work).
136. Indeed, unionization and full employment policies in the postwar era
ultimately gave workers more bargaining power within firms even as the firms
of the postwar era gained greater insulation from competition from other companies. See GALBRAITH, supra note 115, at 121–23.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13.
138. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 145–47, 274–81.
139. See id. at 159–61.
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theless, the managerial inclination to promote broader interests may also have come from greater elite unity in the postwar
era (management and State were inclined to see their interests
as aligned to a greater degree than today), and from the subordination of individual perspectives and incentives to a group
dynamic. This group dynamic selected for team managers, rather than individualists, and produced a shared decision140
making process that moderated extreme views. Both encouraged commitment to distinctive firm identities and alignment
of these identities with broader societal interests. Unlike the
managers of the twenties or the nineties, these captains of industry did not amass extraordinary fortunes, though they did
141
quite well. Perhaps more importantly, the corporate leaders
of this era, unlike those of the twenties or the nineties, identified to a greater degree with their communities and their em142
ployees.
In both of these ways, the idea of the firm as greater than
the individuals who comprised it contributed to the coordination of relationships within the firm, and the relationships between firm, state, and community interests. The law in turn responded by building high marginal tax rates, securities
disclosure and other regulations, and health care, civil rights,
and other worker protections into the new foundation. The firm
as an entity that provided security and stability and advanced
interests greater than the sum of its parts became central to
the life of the nation.
II. THE DEATH OF THE FIRM
If the first seven decades of the twentieth century marked
the rise of the firm as an institution greater than the sum of its
parts, the last part of the twentieth century has marked its
dismantling. Corporate behemoths exemplified American prosperity in the immediate postwar era; they were less nimble in
facing global competition at the end of the century. The intel-

140. See id. at 96.
141. See Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The
Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-Century, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1, 16–19
(1992).
142. See, e.g., Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 314 (1957); see also Mark S. Mizruchi & Daniel
Hirschman, The Modern Corporation as Social Construction, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1065, 1094 (2010) (arguing that the corporate leaders of the era showed
greater concern for the communities where they were headquartered).
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lectual cohesiveness of American elites in the immediate postwar era that contributed to the greater alignment of management and labor, public and private interests gave way to renewed ideological division. Central to these changes was the
reconceptualization of the firm, from an entity greater than the
sum of its parts to the tool, if not play-toy, of a revitalized group
143
of entrepreneurs. In the process are two central ironies. The
attack on the firm was aimed not on large corporations’ multiple weaknesses in entering a new, more competitive era, but on
what had been their strengths. And the attack did not reject
the seminal insights of Coase or Berle and Means. Instead, it
embraced and reinterpreted them.
A. THE NEXUS-OF-CONTRACTS AND AGENCY-COST THEORY
While we now think of Coase’s The Nature of the Firm as
one of his two most important contributions to economic
144
thought, leading ultimately to a Nobel Prize in 1991, economists paid relatively little attention to the piece at the time of
145
its publication. Instead, Coase’s article became far more influential only after its embrace—and reinterpretation—by nex146
us-of-contract scholars decades later. Coase had clearly distinguished between a firm’s external affairs, characterized by
markets, and its internal affairs, with their supersession of the
147
price mechanism. The later scholars who would create the
law and economics literature that has dominated corporate
theory over the last forty years recharacterized Coase’s insight.
They argued the firm could be best understood as “a nexus of
contracts” and that both external and internal affairs involved
market-driven contracts; they were just different kinds of con148
tracts produced by different types of market forces.
Two economists, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, pro149
vided the initial reconstruction. They referred back to neo143. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2500
(2005) (describing nexus-of-contracts theory by stating that “[m]anagers and
shareholders get to play; no one else does”).
144. Coase, supra note 31.
145. Ulen, supra note 19, at 301–02.
146. Ulen characterized it as a “reworking.” Id. at 310. In so doing, Ulen
was referring, in particular, to Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777
(1972).
147. Ulen, supra note 19, at 310.
148. Id. at 319.
149. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 146, at 794.
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150

classical theories of the firm. These theories had focused primarily on returns to scale that compared, for example, the in151
dividual dressmaker to the clothing factory. Both the involvement of multiple employees performing specialized tasks
and the investment in expensive machinery produce returns to
scale, which in turn make the processes of securing adequate
152
supplies and selling the finished products more complex, justifying the growth of the organization coordinating the activi153
ties.
Coase’s insight had been that these firms managed the coordination involved in these more complex organizations
through something other than price; Alchian and Demsetz objected that the problems of coordination involved something
more than simply the substitution of employer direction for
contract terms. Instead, they observed that what the firm did
was to assemble teams of workers who needed to work together
to produce the desired output and production teams inevitably
produced shirking—some team members would invariably
work harder than others in a system in which it was impossible
154
to determine whose input contributed what to net value.
Alchian and Demsetz argued that firms solved the problem
155
through the entrepreneur’s role as a “residual claimant.” The
entrepreneur serves as a monitor who supervises the team to
insure that no one shirks. The entrepreneur pays the team
members a fixed price, which restricts the employees’ jockeying

150. Id. at 781–85.
151. See id. at 784.
152. See Ulen, supra note 19, at 305.
153. See id. at 302.
154. Id. at 310. Robert Flannigan described shirking as follows:
Generally, shirking means reduced effort expenditure. In many instances, shirking is not legally actionable at all. For many tasks,
there is a band of effort between maximal and minimal effort that
remains contractually undefined and therefore subject to unilateral
variation by the agent. That is, workers have a degree of latitude in
the performance of their work. This band or range of discretionary effort typically exists because of information and monitoring weaknesses that prevent more precise specification and enforcement of effort
levels. . . . Principals normally prefer that their agents operate at or
near the maximal level. Agents may prefer to operate near the minimal level. Within any given band of effort, the equilibrium effort level
will be determined by the commitment or enthusiasm of the agent as
influenced by the incentives offered by the principal.
Flannigan, supra note 45, at 397.
155. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 146, at 782–83.
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156

for positions against each other, and keeps the residual profit
left from team efforts, which creates an incentive to guard
157
against shirking. In effect, Alchian and Demsetz’s analysis
reintroduced price mechanisms within the firm. They characterized the firm’s internal contracts as ones in which the entrepreneur had an incentive to monitor in return for the ability to
maximize residual value, and the employees agreed to work for
158
a fixed price subject to such monitoring.
This analysis reconciled Coase’s transaction cost insights
(specifying individual contracts for team units engaging in ongoing production may be costly and inefficient) with the nexusof-contract theories central to modern corporate theory. It narrowed Coase’s concern with uncertainty from a broad range of
issues that include changing consumer tastes, available supplies, and labor conditions to a relatively narrow focus on shirking. It also validated the entrepreneur/owner’s dominant position in the firm. Most fundamentally, however, it eliminated
the developments of the preceding forty years. The idea of firm
identity providing motivation for employee efforts disappeared
from consideration. So, too, did the notion that relationships
within a firm depend on something different from relationships
outside it. Alchian and Demsetz took Coase’s idea of suppression of the price mechanism, which opened the door to consideration of alternative forms of human motivation, and used it
to validate narrow self-interest. The result presented a fundamental challenge to the importance of the firm itself.
B. THE ASSAULT ON THE FIRM
Alchian and Demsetz, in emphasizing the risk of shirking,
focused attention on an issue that Coase had not made central

156. Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout explain that if all employees are simply paid a flat rate, the incentive to shirk increases. If, instead, each employee
is paid after the fact in accordance with his or her contributions, the problem
of rent seeking will increase; that is, of employees seeking to maximize their
share through behavior that may undermine others and impose additional
costs. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 266 (1999).
157. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 146, at 781.
158. Like Coase, Alchian and Demsetz drew no distinction between an initial entrepreneur like Henry Ford and later corporate managers who come and
go without long-term identification with the firm. See Charles R.T. O’Kelley,
Coase, Knight, and the Nexus-of-Contracts Theory of the Firm: A Reflection on
Reification, Reality, and the Corporation as Entrepreneur Surrogate, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247, 1262–64 (2012).
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to his analysis: the separation of ownership and control.
Alchian and Demsetz, after all, posited that the solution to the
problem of corporate organization lay with owners’ ability to
monitor and the incentive that their retention of the corporate
159
residual gave them to do so. This incentive disappears, however, if those receiving the corporate residual (the owner/shareholders) are not those responsible for the monitoring
(the executives). Law and economics scholars came to call this
160
problem “agency costs.”
Coase had not addressed the issue. He described an “entrepreneur” who controlled the company and could be expected
161
to oversee employees. Instead, Berle, and Berle and Means
together, had galvanized discussion of these issues. Berle, a
corporate lawyer, had seen the shenanigans (and often outright
fraud) of the twenties, when companies diluted the value of
common stock, effectively fleecing shareholders, or took “heads
I win, tails you lose” risks with publicly traded companies that
left shareholders holding the bag for ill-advised ventures. Rather than see corporate owners as the solution, he distrusted
162
them. The agency-cost theorists needed to rewrite Berle as
fundamentally as they had reinterpreted Coase—and they did.
When the corporate governance debate resumed in the seventies, the corporation no longer symbolized the concentration
159. While many people assume that shareowners “own” corporations,
firms employ a variety of ownership structures that suggest various possible
meanings (and multiple groups) associated with the idea of ownership. See
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190–92 (2002).
160. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976).
161. See O’Kelley, supra note 158, at 1248, 1250 (stating that Coase asserted that the firm depended on the entrepreneur, its “distinct central actor”).
Coase’s failure to mention Berle is itself interesting. Some scholars have suggested that it reflects the balkanization of academic disciplines in that era.
Berle was a law professor, Coase an economist. Berle’s co-author, Means, was,
however, an economist, though they wrote more for legal and policy audiences
than a more technical academic one. See Wells, supra note 61, at 307. Of
course, Coase was a graduate student in economics in London at the time he
conceived of the paper, and he may simply not have been aware of Berle and
Means’s work. Another possibility, however, is that he thought of the nature of
his inquiry as fundamentally different. Coase, after all, sought to explain the
advantages of large corporations in coordinating production. Berle and Means
addressed the threat large corporations posed to interests that had relatively
little to do with production.
162. Though as we noted above, Berle and Dodd’s views both changed over
time. See discussion supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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of unaccountable power in the hands of a few. Instead, the new
concern was complacency. Charles O’Kelley writes that the reality of the mature corporation “was not risk-taking and
swashbuckling leadership by individualistic CEOs. Rather,
planning and collective decision making by experts was the key
163
to survival and success.” The new theorists of the firm argued
that managers had become too fat and happy. Instead of using
corporate assets to their own ends by engaging in risky or unwise ventures, they failed to take risks that might benefit
shareholders, particularly if such risks threatened their own
164
(or in some cases their employees’) comfortable sinecures. The
problem was not that they failed to look out for the corporate
entities’ interests—in the sense of longer-term interests associated with the firm; it was that they were too eager to do so—at
the expense of the shareholders’ prospects for short-term re165
turns.
Empirical findings by scholars sympathetic to the new theories provided support for their conclusions. They found, for example, that CEOs tended to resist takeover bids, even when the
166
acquirers offered a substantial premium. The CEOs further
favored corporate acquisitions that did not necessarily increase
167
corporate valuation. These studies also showed that when
CEOs enjoyed a substantial ownership stake in the company,
their behavior changed—making them more willing to entertain hostile bids or to resist acquisitions unlikely to produce a
168
quick payoff.

163. O’Kelley, supra note 56, at 1005.
164. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 160, at 312.
165. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The
Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11, 30 (1986) (noting “basic
tension[s] between managers and shareholders,” including managerial preferences “biased in favor of growth over profitability”); Comment, The AttorneyClient Privilege in Shareholders’ Suits, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 318 (1969)
(“Management . . . is encouraged to represent interests broader than those of
the shareholders or any group of shareholders—interests which include those
of the public and the labor force.”).
166. Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Corporate Finance, the Theory
of the Firm, and Organizations, 12 J. ECON. PERS. 95, 101 (1998); see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 747 (1997) (discussing current literature regarding managers’ views
towards takeovers).
167. Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 166; see also Schleifer & Vishny, supra note 166, at 746–47 (observing that managers often chose acquisitions
that served management objectives even if they lowered firm valuation).
168. Bolton & Scharfstein, supra note 166.
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The new generation of corporate theorists again saw this
very different problem as arising from the separation of owner169
ship and control. The solution, however, was not to reinforce
Berle and Means’s call for greater judicial or government oversight. Instead, their solutions would be to bring back the price
mechanism both within the firm and without. To do so, they did
not just inveigh against the corporation as a fiction that could
170
and should be ignored. They ultimately sought to reduce the
entity to no more than a vehicle to facilitate market exchang171
es.
Economists Michael Jensen and William Meckling fired off
an influential salvo in this effort soon after Alchian and
172
Demsetz. They seconded Alchian and Demsetz’s findings that
the separation of ownership and control created monitoring
173
problems, which they termed “agency costs.” They observed,
however, that if this apparent conflict of interest were in fact
insurmountable, no rational shareholder would buy stock. Instead, they argued that agency costs were ubiquitous. The conflicts of interest between management and shareholders, for
example, also existed between management and bondholders.
The financial composition of the firm could therefore be explained in terms of the optimal tradeoff among these types of
costs and their associated risks. In explaining this process (and
incorporating it within the nexus-of-contracts approach), Jensen and Meckling went to great lengths to emphasize that the
corporation as entity was not in any way special:
Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships
among individuals also serves to make it clear that the personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as “what should be
the objective function of the firm,” or “does the firm have a social re-

169. See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (1991) (advancing the idea that “investors
are ‘powerless’” because managers control the firm, and can control how much
investors know about the firm); FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW (Roberta
Romano ed., 1993) (discussing agency problems in a collection of writings).
170. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 160, at 310–11.
171. Jensen and Meckling thus defined the private corporation or firm as
“simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual
claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be
sold without permission of the other contracting individuals.” Id. at 311 (emphasis omitted).
172. Id.
173. Indeed, this was the title of their article: Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Id. at 305.
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sponsibility” is seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual. It
is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in
which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may
“represent” other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a
framework of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the
firm is like the behavior of a market; i.e., the outcome of a complex
equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the
wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error
by thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motiva174
tions and intentions.

This denial of the importance of the firm as an entity
served several purposes. It reinforced Alchian and Demsetz’s
conclusion that the focus should be on the incentive effects of
contracts within the firm rather than characterization of the
firm’s operations in non-market terms. To the same end, it rejected Coase’s distinction between the firm’s external and internal relationships. Instead, within the nexus-of-contracts
model, the conception of firm boundaries became meaningless
and it thus made “little or no sense to try to distinguish those
things which are ‘inside’ the firm (or any other organization)
175
from those things that are ‘outside’ of it.” Recasting the firm
this way made it possible to explain how market discipline, rather than the suppression of the price mechanism, explained
firm structure. Jensen and Meckling wrote that analysis decrying the separation of ownership and control “is equivalent in
every sense to comparing a world in which iron ore is a scarce
commodity (and therefore costly) to a world in which it is freely
available at zero resource cost” and then concluding that the
176
first world is “non-optimal.” They dismissively termed this
line of reasoning the “Nirvana” form of analysis and attributed
177
the “Nirvana” reference to Coase himself.
C. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES
Legal scholars embraced the nexus-of-contracts approach
to argue that all that was necessary was to get the law out of
178
the way so that the market could perform its magic. Within
174. Id. at 311 (emphasis omitted).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 328.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 169, at 15 (“The normative thesis of the book is that corporate law should contain the terms people
would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every
contingency sufficiently low.”); see also Millon, supra note 21, at 1025–34
(summarizing developments).
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this framework, the firm itself and, indeed, obligations to the
firm as an entity and the firm’s obligations outside of voluntary
contracts became meaningless. Eisenberg concluded that “at
bottom the nexus-of-contracts conception is not a theory of the
firm: It is a theory of why there are no firms”; a conclusion that
conflicts with Coase, Berle and Means, and “reality as it is
179
normally understood.”
As these scholars wrote, however, corporate markets themselves were changing. In another era, changes such as dramatic
increases in executive compensation might have been cause for
180
concern. Instead, this new generation of scholars became
cheerleaders for critical moves away from the cautious managerial era in which executives identified with multiple firm
constituencies and arguably the firm itself. Instead, multiple
forces institutionalized the “death of the firm” by reducing the
multiple purposes identified with business entities to shortterm shareholder value.
First, corporate compensation packages changed to empha181
size stock options. Law and economics scholars celebrated the
move as a way to better align management and shareholder in182
terests. Favorable tax treatment of the options increased the
183
incentives to use them. So, too, did the fact that under the accounting standards of the time, the options did not have to be
expensed, which effectively disguised what were in fact large
184
increases in executive compensation. Between 1980 and 1994,

179. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus
of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 832 (1999).
180. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW
FERDINAND PECORA’S INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER
CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE 142–66 (2010) (concluding that one of the most
startling revelations to come from the Pecora Commission hearings was the
size of the compensation packages senior banking executives received); Wells,
supra note 61, at 319–20 (observing that at the height of the Great Depression, many questioned the morality of outsized corporate compensation on any
basis).
181. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 320–21 (2012).
182. See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311–12 (1988); David
I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (2011) (“Clearly, long-term, equitybased compensation can play a role in shaping managerial incentives that
straight salary cannot.”).
183. Dallas, supra note 181, at 320.
184. Id.
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stock option grants rose by 683%, with the average grant to the
185
top executive rising from $155,000 to $1.2 million.
Second, the market for corporate control flourished in the
eighties. During that period, one-half of publicly traded corpo186
rations received tender offers, many of them hostile. Corporate theorists argued that the takeover market would police
management; CEOs who failed to maximize corporate opportunities would find themselves to be the subject of takeover actions by those who thought they could better optimize firm val187
188
The increase in takeover bids
had two reinforcing
ue.
effects. If managers resisted bids that shareholders favored, it
reinforced the conviction that shareholder and manager interests diverged, increasing the risk of shareholder activism de189
signed to undermine management control. At the same time,
as stock options became a larger component of corporate compensation packages, it also made managers more focused on
stock price, both because they benefitted from share increases
and because low stock prices made it more likely that the com190
pany would become a takeover target.

185. Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2002).
186. Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry
Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 199
(1996).
187. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 295 (1980) (arguing that the viability of a “large
corporation with diffuse security ownership” can be explained by the policing
of market forces within and outside the firm, “with the market for outside
takeovers providing discipline of last resort”); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of
Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 (1978) (“[I]nefficient performance by
management is reflected in share price thus making the corporation a likely
candidate for a takeover bid. Since a successful takeover bid often results in
the displacement of current management, managers have a strong incentive to
operate efficiently and keep share prices high.”).
188. See David R. Meals, CEO & Employee Pay Discrepancy: How the Government’s Policies Have Encouraged the Gap, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP &
L. 297, 307 (2013) (“[I]n the mid-1980s . . . [a]s a result of court decisions, legal
entitlement to approve hostile takeovers shifted from a firm’s shareholders to
its management and board of directors. . . . At about the same time there was
a push for pay-for-performance by big institutional investors that caused a
dramatic increase in the use of stock options and restricted stock in CEO pay
packages.”).
189. See Dallas, supra note 181, at 320.
190. Id. at 320–21; see also Fischel, supra note 187, at 5 (“The lower the
market price of the securities . . . the more attractive the firm is to outsiders
with the ability to take the firm over.”).
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Third, overall executive compensation increased, whether
premised on base salaries or incentive pay, and became more
steeply hierarchical. The ratio between CEO and average
worker compensation changed from 20.3 in 1965 to 28.5 in 1978
191
to 55.9 in 1989 to 106.9 in 1999. By 2013, the pay ratio between CEOs and average wage workers was 331:1 and the pay
192
ratio between CEOs and minimum wage workers was 774:1.
While the greater use of stock options constituted the major
193
shift, salaries increased as well, often in accordance with reductionist merit pay regimes that intensified competition
among managers and created greater disparities even among a
194
firm’s top executives. Between 1993 and 2014, the percentage
of CEO compensation attributable to incentive pay increased
195
from thirty-five percent to eighty-five percent. And together
with both the greater risk of takeovers and the winner-take-all
mentality of executive compensation, management tenure de196
creased. Larry Ribstein described the emergence of a new
breed of executives who are the “hyper-motivated survivors of a
197
highly competitive tournament.” These executives, socialized
to believe that their out-sized compensation packages are a
measure of their worth, have “the proven ability to make mon198
ey while putting on a veneer of loyalty to the firm.”
191. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, 2000–
2001, at 211 (2001).
192. Executive Paywatch: High-Paid CEOs and the Low-Wage Economy,
AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2014 (last visited
Nov. 27, 2016).
193. Executives also faced greater risk of dismissals if stock earnings did
not increase. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 677, 695 (2011) (indicating that CEO terminations can be linked to
share price performance).
194. For a discussion of the move toward incentive pay, see MICHAEL B.
DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT
FAILED AND HOW TO FIX IT 78–79 (2014) (discussing assumptions that incentives would spur better performance).
195. Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of “Pay for Performance,” 39 J. CORP. L. 527, 533 (2014).
196. Between 2000 and 2011, CEO tenure declined from about ten years to
8.4. Average Tenure of CEOs Declined to 8.4 Years, the Conference Board Reports, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news
-releases/average-tenure-of-ceos-declined-to-84-years-the-conference-board
-reports-147152135.html. With the economic recovery, turnover may be decreasing.
197. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002).
198. Id.
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Cumulatively, these changes in fact created a closer alignment between CEO and shareholder perspectives. Both saw the
199
firm as a source of profit. Both linked firm health to share
price and had incentives to do so. Shareholders (at least in theory) celebrated executives’ willingness to take greater risks, in
part because they most typically held their individual shares as
part of a mutual fund or other collective investment device designed to diversify investment risk; today’s silent majority
shareholders are more likely than in the twenties and thirties
to be institutional investors rather than individuals with their
200
life savings at risk. Executives, spurred on by stock options
and merit pay incentives, measured their success (or failure) in
201
terms of short-term fluctuations in share price. By the end of
the 1990s, corporate officers and directors had adopted
measures, such as “poison pill” provisions, that tamed the
1980s’ market for corporate control; yet, the changes attributable to greater use of stock options, increased overall compensation, and the tournament mentality that took hold in the execu202
Whereas the law and economics
tive ranks remained.
scholars had viewed perks such as use of the corporate jet as
examples of a reallocation of shareholder assets to management, the new generation of scholars was more likely to view
the increase in compensation as the product of a competitive
203
market that served shareholder interests.

199. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 9, at 721 (noting that not all shareholders
want immediate profit maximization; some may want to benefit human welfare through “very large-scale, very long-term enterprises”).
200. Shareholders nonetheless are a diverse lot with varied motivations.
Id. at 721–22.
201. See Dallas, supra note 181; Millon, supra note 21, at 1040.
202. See Stout, supra note 9, at 711–13 (“Toward the end of the twentieth
century, however, American public companies began to change. . . . [S]hare
price became a popular metric and stock options the favorite form of compensation. . . . Directors and executives now often run public companies with a
single goal in mind: maximizing shareholder value.”).
203. Indeed, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argued that shareholder primacy marked “[t]he [e]nd of [h]istory for [c]orporate [l]aw.”
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 129, at 440. They explained that academic, business, and governmental elites shared a consensus that
ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder
class; the managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders;
. . . and the market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is
the principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.
Id. at 440–41.
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In these calculations, the firm as entity, with longer term
204
or more broadly defined interests, fades from view. The result, however, is not some type of shareholder primacy in which
majority shareholders assert greater control over the compa205
ny. Instead, the firm becomes something closer to what Berle
feared: the plaything of controlling owners, directors, or managers.
D. THE REDEFINITION OF CORPORATE PURPOSE
The economic analysis of the seventies and eighties combined with a new wave of corporate law scholarship and a more
dynamic stock market to redefine corporate purpose. In accordance with the new analysis, the firm as an ideal that has value
on its own terms disappears. In its place comes a reductionist
notion of relationships—the firm becomes a vehicle for maximizing shareholder investments and short-term share values be206
come the measure of success.
To examine the limitations of this model, it is necessary to
go back to the questions that Coase and Berle and Means posed
initially. For Coase, the secret to the firm lay with the suppression of the price mechanism. Eighty years later, management
studies emphasize the same thing Coase did—motivation tied
to firm identity is a more powerful motivator than price—
though for reasons that transcend the ability to command em207
ployees directly.

204. What did not happen, however, was an increase in the rights of shareholders to control management. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1813 (2006) (advocating greater
shareholder power to amend the corporate charter or change the state of incorporation); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93
VA. L. REV. 675, 679–94 (2007) (documenting unsuccessful challenges to corporate management from 1996 to 2005).
205. Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy” 6 (Univ. of
Cal., L.A. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-04,
2011), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1763944.
206. See Vermeulen, supra note 15, at 714 (noting that current firm “culture is characterized by a short-term mentality that often leads to stricter control mechanisms on corporate executives and demands for increased dividends
and stock buybacks”).
207. See Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1751 (2006) (discussing the relationship between trust,
loyalty, and reciprocity); Stout, supra note 205 (arguing against a “shareholder
primacy” rule and discussing several theories suggesting that price motivation
is not in shareholders’ best interest).
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For Berle and Means, the meaning of the firm lay not just
with the role of the entity in directing its employees, but the obligations of the corporation to the broader community, includ208
ing other stakeholders. These obligations came from the nature of the firm itself as a powerful actor in shaping
communities. With globalization, more competitive markets,
more intense ideological divisions, and the resurgence of class
differences, however, firms do not play the same roles in their
communities as they did in the beginning of the century and
they do not depend to the same degree on the well-being of
209
their communities.
To deal with these changes, therefore, it is necessary to rethink the nature of the firm in the three roles it has played over
the course of the twentieth century. First is the reidentification of the risks: Where does unaccountable power reside today? Second is the question of the good: Has the loss of
firm as motivator become an obstacle to more cohesive and productive workplaces? Third are the ugly issues that remain: If
the firm no longer serves societal interests in individual security and community membership, what should take its place?
III. BACK TO THE FUTURE
The firm is dead. That is, the nearly century-long arc that
saw the rise of the large American corporation, its dominance
within American communities, and its emergence as a co-equal
partner with Big Government and Big Labor has reached its
end. To be sure, corporations and firms of various sizes and
210
structure remain. They do not, however, play the same role in

208. See supra text accompanying notes 105–06.
209. Of course, some large employers continue to have a disproportionate
impact on some communities. Compare DAN DIMICCO, AMERICAN MADE: WHY
MAKING THINGS WILL RETURN US TO GREATNESS 3 (2015) (boasting of avoiding layoffs while CEO of Nucor, a large American steel company), with William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2014, http://
www.hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity (describing role of Wall Street
in prompting plant closings).
210. Major manufacturing firms—machinery, automakers, and extractive
operations—still exist, of course. However, these sectors now only employ
about twenty percent of U.S. workers. Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibility, Legal
Reform, and Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 91 (2009). Furthermore,
[i]n the 1990s, the percentage of large firms in the manufacturing
sector dropped considerably while the share of microenterprises
surged. . . . The number of medium-sized and small firms also de-
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assembling and motivating labor or coordinating commercial
and civic well-being. In addition, while corporate excess and
malfeasance persist, the sources of the problem—and their so211
lutions—will not be the same. It is accordingly time to reckon
212
213
Berlean,
with the death of the firm, as the Coasean,
214
Galbraithian firm has been understood over the course of
much of the twentieth century, and to consider what part of its
functions need to be replicated elsewhere.
This Part will address the two topics carrying through this
Article. First, we will discuss Coase’s insight about the suppression of the price mechanism in the context of human motivation and ask what remains about the role of firm identity in
motivating behavior. We will argue that both management and
labor have more tenuous connections with their places of employment than they did in the middle of the twentieth century
and that the reinforcing roles of firm identity and employee
loyalty now persist primarily in distinct niches that character215
ize the minority of employment relationships. The role of firm
as entity has accordingly become less important in either moticlined considerably. While the share of large firms dropped from 1.5%
to 0.9%, microenterprises grew from 86.9% to 92.6%.
Id. at 91 n.209 (citing Enrique de la Garza Toledo, Estructura Industrial y
Condiciones de Trabajo en la Manufactura, in LA SITUACIÓN DEL TRABAJO EN
MÉXICO, 2003, 251, 253–54 (Enrique de la Garza & Carlos Salas eds., 2004)).
The microenterprises tend to grow into much larger entities, get acquired by
larger entities, or go out of business. The result, overall, contributes to labor
insecurity. See discussion infra note 237.
211. Indeed, a full discussion of the new sources of misfeasance would require a substantial discussion of the financial sector. See, e.g., Lazonick, supra
note 209 (noting that since the late 1970s, a “downsize-and-distribute regime
of reducing costs and then distributing the freed-up cash to financial interests,
particularly shareholders[,] . . . has contributed to employment instability and
income inequality”).
212. In the sense of Coase’s initial article exploring the firm’s suppression
of the market mechanism in favor of internal markets. See supra text accompanying notes 29–36.
213. In the sense of Berle’s and Berle and Means’s classic works from the
twenties and thirties exploring the concentration of power that made the
abuses leading to the Great Depression possible. See supra text accompanying
notes 95–97, 105–06.
214. In the sense of Galbraith’s chronicle of the distinctive features of firm
management during the managerial era. See supra text accompanying notes
55–74.
215. See Declining Employee Loyalty: A Casualty of the New Workplace,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 9, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/declining-employee-loyalty-a-casualty-of-the-new-workplace (stating
that relationships with organizations are getting weaker, and some people believe that “company loyalty is dead”).
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vating management or securing employee stability. It cannot
therefore be a reliable foundation for extending public benefits
such as health care or securing public purposes such as non216
discriminatory employment policies.
Second, we will consider Berle’s concern about the impact
of corporations on polities and argue that with the death of the
firm or, more specifically, the end of the insulation from market
competition that large corporations enjoyed, that relationship
needs to be re-examined. The managerial era involved a publicprivate partnership that conferred benefits on firms premised
on the presumption that firms would serve public as well as
private ends. The end of this relationship and of the assumptions on which it was based requires re-examination not just of
corporate obligations, but of public ones.
Third, we will consider the question of abuse of power in
the new era. Both the reinterpretation of Coase in the agencycost literature and Berle and Dodd’s various positions in their
iconic debate involved the conflicts of interest that arose from
the separation of ownership and control. We will consider the
risks of an era that has produced a greater alignment of ownership and control, raising a different set of issues. In this new
technological age, corporate management’s greater flexibility
has permitted it to outpace public regulation and unionization
to acquire greater leverage in labor markets and cross-border
transactions. Rather than recreate the older model of static
regulation, we will consider the possibilities for alternative approaches that increase labor flexibility and mobility in parallel
ways.
A. THE FIRM OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL ERA AS NETWORK
The firm of the industrial era, with its dependence on static supply chains; a large, trained labor force; and insulation
216. Gerald F. Davis, How Financial Markets Dissolved the Society of Organizations, RASSEGNA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA 13, 19 (2012), http://web
user.bus.umich.edu/gfdavis/Papers/davis_12_RIS.pdf (“Large-scale employers
that provided job security, career mobility through job ladders, and generous
health and retirement benefits seem to have been artifacts of the corporateindustrial age in the US.”). For further discussion of the relationship between
the changing structure of employment and worker security, see Mark Berger,
The Contingent Employee Benefits Problem, 32 IND. L. REV. 301, 303–05 (1999)
(emphasizing the importance of workplace benefits and the related problems
inherent in contingent employment); Glynn, supra note 2 (explaining how the
disaggregation of firms into several, often independent parts presents a difficulty in holding firms liable for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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217

from competition, is fading. As commercial organization has
become more fluid, the entity-based corporate theory of the
managerial era has also given way to a more individualistic regime that, like Justice Alito, treats the firm as a legal fiction
that can be discounted or ignored, except where it chooses to
218
contractually bind itself. These changes in commercial organization and legal theory parallel and often accelerate a corresponding set of economic changes. Large corporations no longer
depend to the same degree on a large labor force, nor with globalization do firms enjoy the same degree of insulation from
219
competition. Instead, commercial actors strive for flexibility,
organizing their enterprises to minimize and concentrate core
sectors, and coordinate them with a rapidly changing mix of
220
subsidiaries or independent contractors. As a result, the reciprocity that existed because of corporate dependence on employee stability and employer provision of secure employment is
221
rapidly disappearing.
Firms of various sizes and structures still exist, of course,
222
and so do a number of relatively secure positions. Yet even
large and successful firms cannot guarantee their survival in
any particular form. One need only think of the trajectory from
IBM to Microsoft to Apple and perhaps on to Google and its
competitors to underscore the difference. The same firms that
dominated the American landscape in 1910 continued to do so
223
in 1970. The firms that do so today involve a mix of financial
(Berkshire-Hathaway), tech (Apple), and retail (Walmart) gi217. See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at xv, 75 (noting that
flexibility, mobility, and network forces have become more dominant, and “the
main source of value added is no longer the exploitation of geographically located resources (like mines, or especially fertile land), or the exploitation of a
labour force at work, but the ability to take full advantage of the most diverse
kinds of knowledge, to interpret and combine them”).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 5, 9, 17.
219. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 73 (describing the relationship between global competition, innovation, and “lean” firm principles
that emphasize innovation).
220. Id. at 75.
221. See Davis, supra note 216, at 16–20.
222. See generally ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS : THE RISE
OF POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1970S-2000S (2011) (arguing that the information economy tends to
produce more good jobs and bad jobs, hollowing out the center).
223. Cf. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 92–94, 118–19 (citing to Fortune financial reports to illustrate the scale of prominent corporations like AT&T
and General Motors, and describing the security inherent in executive life
based on longevity of positions).
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ants in addition to more traditional energy and auto compa224
nies. In this era, individuals may well be bigger than the
firms they head; it remains to be seen whether, twenty years
from now, Apple prospers without Steve Jobs and whether Bill
Gates’s philanthropic ventures become more important than
Microsoft’s business outlook.
For individual employees, the changes are more dramatic.
Neither top executives nor blue collar employees expect to remain at a single firm. The ambitious see many positions as
stepping stones in a personal saga rather than as a source of
225
Workers have minimal or no loyalty—nor
commitment.
should they, when they have become fungible commodities and
226
their employers have become transitory. And the business
stars of the new economy are start-ups, willing to take risks
that, if they pay off, will transform the nature of the operation
227
and, if they fail, will doom its existence. In this new model,
the firm has become a nexus of private contracts in which identity, loyalty, and reciprocity play diminished roles, where they
228
survive at all. Scholars call the change in the nature of work
229
In this system, Uber,
the “casualization of employment.”
which supplies automobile rides much like a taxi service, is the
new exemplar. Uber sets up software that will hook up people
who want labor services with people who will provide them.

224. Indeed, the top ten in the Fortune 500 list now include Walmart, Apple, Berkshire Hathaway, and CVS Pharmacy in addition to auto and energy
giants such as General Motors, Exxon, and Chevron. Fortune 500, FORTUNE,
http://www.fortune.com/fortune500 (last visited Nov. 27, 2016).
225. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 93–95 (observing that “the
transition from one project to the next . . . increase[s] one’s employability,” and
also increases opportunism and self-interested behavior; even if the employee
succeeds in becoming more valuable to the company, the company promises in
turn not security, but employability both within the firm and elsewhere).
226. Richard Bales et al., A Comparative Analysis of Labor Outsourcing, 31
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 579, 617 (2014) (“In contrast to the long-term, relatively stable employment relationships that characterized the manufacturingbased economy of most of the twentieth century, an increasing proportion of
workers in the United States today are ‘contingent.’”).
227. For a discussion of efforts to capture the entrepreneurial spirit (and
employee loyalty) within large companies, see Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M.
Vermeulen, The New Firm, Staying Relevant, Unique & Competitive (Lex Research Topics in Corp. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2015-5, 2015), http://
www.ssrn.com/abstract=2659763.
228. Indeed, even though the management literature continues to emphasize the importance of employee loyalty, such loyalty depends on bonds of reciprocity that are in much shorter supply. See Hart & Thompson, supra note 81.
229. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 224.
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The infrastructure disappears. The software (and the entrepreneurs who design it and keep it going) links independent contractors who provide monetized services directly with paying
customers. While the company makes money, the drivers
providing services may be considered independent contractors
rather than employees (a matter that is currently being litigat230
ed). They have independence, including the ability to structure their working hours and conditions, but no security and no
benefits. And, as Geoffrey Fowler noted, “There’s an Uber for
everything now. . . . Heal sends a doctor on a house call, while
Saucey will rush over alcohol. . . . Dufl will pack your suitcase
231
and Eaze will reup a medical marijuana supply.”
In this world, the firm as entity has neither a fixed identity
nor a permanent existence. The meaning of the firm, if it is to
remain viable, has to be seen in different terms.
B. WHAT REMAINS OF CORPORATE IDENTITY AND LOYALTY?
The firms that remain, for better or worse, are subject to
greater competitive pressures and more dynamic marketplaces.
They need to be more nimble to adjust to rapid changes in
232
technology and the challenges of global markets. Within this
framework, companies have adopted leaner production—and
233
employment—systems. Firms invest less in employees, preferring those who obtain training and experience elsewhere.
Firms also offer less security in terms of employment or bene234
fits to the employees they do hire. The most ambitious employees in turn recognize the need to acquire experience, but

230. The misclassification lawsuits against Uber and Lyft, alleging that the
companies erroneously classify their drivers as independent contractors rather
than employees, are probably just the first wave of such suits. See, e.g.,
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-CV-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) (upholding a $100 million settlement and retaining the independent contractor classification, but having Uber agree to implement drivers’ associations in each state to review grievances); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No.
13-CV-04065-VC, 2016 WL 3561742, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2016) (upholding a new settlement agreement with both nonmonetary and monetary aspects, the latter of which “contemplates payment of roughly 17 percent of the
value of the $156 million reimbursement claim”).
231. Geoffrey A. Fowler, There’s an Uber for Everything Now, WALL ST. J.
(May 5, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/theres-an-uber-for-everything-now
-1430845789.
232. See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 73–75.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 94.
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may view companies as no more than vehicles to the next posi235
tion.
In this new system, how do we understand Coase’s insight
that the advantage of the firm comes from the suppression of
the price system? Part of the answer is that it vindicates that
insight. If we compare skilled and unskilled workers, firms today contract out (that is, they use market contracts) to secure
236
an increasing percentage of the unskilled labor they need.
This outsourcing may be to call centers in India, to independent
contractors in the United States who provide janitorial services, or to temp agencies who supply individual workers. The
firms presumably make the calculation Coase described, determining that the price mechanism works quite well in securing essentially fungible labor at a time of international compe237
tition and slack markets for unskilled labor. Corporations
remain more likely to bring employees in-house to perform
more sophisticated tasks, such as engineering or product design, that are harder to specify, to supervise, or to divide into
discrete parts. Companies, of course, are also more likely to

235. See id. at 93–95.
236. See James M. Cooper, The North American Free Trade Agreement and
Its Legacy on the Resolution of Intellectual Property Disputes, 43 CAL. W. INT’L
L.J. 157, 176–77 (2012) (“We are living, at least in the United States, in a
post-industrial, or knowledge-based, economy. As the United States outsourced millions of manufacturing jobs to Mexico, China, and any number of
other industrializing countries with abundant low-cost unskilled labor, the
United States was able to base its economic growth on services and new innovations.” (footnote omitted)); see also DAVID WEIL, IMPROVING WORKPLACE
CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 9–10 (2010), https://www
.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicenforcement.pdf.
237. While large firms may thus choose to outsource unskilled services
such as janitorial work, the small businesses that provide such services make
independent calculations about whether to encourage longer worker tenure
through greater investment in their employees. Even if these firms do so,
however, the individual worker may still experience greater employment instability if the small businesses are more likely than large ones to go bankrupt, close, and reopen with different management. Cf. Timothy Bates & Alfred Nucci, An Analysis of Small Business Size and Rate of Discontinuance, J.
SMALL BUS. MGMT., Oct. 1989, at 1, 4 (discussing statistical findings demonstrating that firm size inversely correlates with rate of discontinuance). The
creation of these companies, however, has occurred in large part because larger companies have chosen to deal with potential uncertainty in demand
through outsourcing these activities, in effect shifting the risk of future market conditions to the small businesses. See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra
note 14, at 73–74 (describing this outsourcing as part of the process of creating
“leaner” organizations).
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bring employees in-house where the skills are valuable, firm
238
specific, and/or hard to find.
This dynamic contributes to the growing inequality in
American wages and it recreates a form of class structure within American firms. If we go back to Galbraith’s description of
the managerial era, he describes different groups within the
firm with varying levels of identification with the firm brand
and varying degrees of loyalty associated with that identifica239
tion. The technological era’s reorganization of commercial activities makes the concept of firm as entity less critical for each
group:
1. Shareholders. This group, both in the managerial era
and today, combines the greatest emphasis on monetary
incentives with the least identification with the firm’s
240
identity and mission.
2. Unskilled workers. Galbraith argued that identification
with the firm was least likely to affect the productivity of
241
these workers. In the production line era, these were
the workers most likely in fact to be subject to employer
commands (rather than enjoy discretion), and they are
242
the group most likely to be outsourced today.
3. Supervisory personnel (such as foremen), clerical, sales,
and other routine white collar personnel. Today, this category is much smaller, with the supervisors outsourced
with the employees they supervise, routine clerical work
done by computer, and the remaining tasks often becom243
ing more sophisticated.
238. Andy Sealock & Christopher Stacey, Why Some U.S. Companies Are
Giving up on Outsourcing, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/ciocentral/2013/01/16/why-some-u-s-companies-are-giving-up-on
-outsourcing/#1f368f9a51ba.
239. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 187–91.
240. Id. at 187–88.
241. Id. at 188–90.
242. Id.; Laurie Monahan, Re-Organized Labor: Affirming Labor’s Relevance by Reframing Its Image and Merging with Allies, 3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP.
L.F. 438, 458–59 (2013).
243. For example, the typing pool is gone, and the group of personal assistants is much smaller at the same time that administrative assistants often do
things that require more firm-specific knowledge and judgment. See What
Happened to All the Secretaries, GREENKEY RESOURCES: GREEN KEY BLOG
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.greenkeyllc.com/blog/what-happened-to-all-the
-secretaries (“According to one study of the data, the five years since 2007 saw
businesses eliminating 1.9 million office and administrative support jobs.”
(citation omitted)).
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4. Skilled workers: technicians, engineers, sales executives,
scientists, designers, and other specialists who comprise
the technostructure. This is the group for whom firm
identity and loyalty remains most critical, with employ244
ers eager to attract and retain professionals. At the
same time, however, information itself has become much
more readily accessible; the most valuable employees are
those adept at finding it, assembling the needed compo245
nents, and motivating those around them.
5. Executives or management. Galbraith wrote that “[a]s
one moves through these inner circles, identification and
246
adaptation become increasingly important.”
Consider now today’s large firm. The two groups whose
tenure has shortened and whose loyalty to the firm has become
247
more contingent are the unskilled and senior management.
And these changes correspond with the creation of more clearly
defined class differences.
At the top, executive pay has increased, it is more tied to
248
stock options, and executive tenure has shortened. Top executives, in turn, make considerably more than the next tier of
managers. At the same time, boards have become more influen249
tial and the percentage of outside directors has increased. As
a result, the identification of boards (often comprised of executives from other companies), top managers, and shareholders
with each other has grown, with all of the groups placing more
250
emphasis on quarterly earnings and share price. This group
of officers and directors, whose income and wealth has reached
extraordinary levels, identify to a greater degree with each oth251
er. They share similar perspectives and often set each other’s
252
salaries.

244. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 190–91.
245. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPPELLO, supra note 14, at 75–76.
246. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 191.
247. For discussion of the impact of these changes, see generally Steven N.
Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L
REV. FIN. 57 (2012).
248. Id. at 58; Nitzan Shilon, CEO Stock Ownership Policies—Rhetoric and
Reality, 90 IND. L.J. 353, 362 (2015).
249. See Kaplan & Minton, supra note 247, at 59, 75.
250. See andré douglas pond cummings et al., Toward a Critical Corporate
Law Pedagogy and Scholarship, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 397, 401 n.19 (2014);
Shilon, supra note 248.
251. See cummings et al., supra note 250, at 401 (“The ability of the CEO to
stack the board of directors with cultural clones is key to the new power of the
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Their benchmarks for success have become more focused
on the short-term, and their careers are less likely to take place
within a single company. The motivation of this group has accordingly changed most, from identification with a particular
firm’s objectives to a more generic management focus that combines a greater association of firm well-being with share prices
253
and individual success with financial rewards. This group,
which constitutes a new elite, identifies much less with particular firms than either entrepreneurs (think Mark Zuckerberg’s
association with Facebook) or the technical class of engineers
254
and other professionals.
At the same time, companies still compete for skilled workers and seek to motivate their employees through identification
255
with the firm. These workers continue to have relatively se256
cure positions with substantial benefits, even as overall firm
257
employment has declined. Nonetheless, their career trajectories have also changed as they see advancement less in terms of
the climbing of a fixed career ladder within a given firm and
more in terms of “employability,” that is, the acquisition of
skills and experiences that make them more marketable both
258
within the firm and without.
While differences in pay have increased between top management and the professional group, so too have the wages in
these skilled positions increased faster than the wages of the
unskilled. Looking at the economy as a whole, blue collar workCEO.”).
252. See Bernice Grant, Independent Yet Captured: Compensation Committee Independence After Dodd-Frank, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 778 (2014) (“CEOs
who serve as directors of other companies have self-interested incentives to
approve high compensation for the CEOs of the companies on whose board
they serve because CEO pay is set using peer group comparisons.”).
253. See, e.g., cummings et al., supra note 250, at 399 (“CEOs act as the
new potentates in American society and manage their firms as personal fiefdoms.”).
254. See WILLIAM LAZONICK, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY IN THE NEW
ECONOMY? BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND HIGH TECH EMPLOYMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 12–13, 197 (2009) (reporting on the change in orientation of
executives from a career ladder in a single company to salaries that are set by
the external market).
255. HISLOP, supra note 51.
256. KALLEBERG, supra note 222, at 70–71, 78, 86.
257. Id. at 92–93.
258. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 93. The authors emphasize that this acquisition of experience increases personal capital and thus
“employability,” but it also increases opportunism and self-interested behavior. Id. at 94–95.
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ers (particularly men) saw their wages stagnate and their em259
ployment instability increase in the period from 1979 to 2008.
In contrast, male college graduates’ employment stability did
not change and their income continued to increase, though
those with only Bachelor of Arts degrees have seen their in260
comes level off after 2000.
This creates three groups with radically different identification with companies: (1) a management elite that views the
company from without, as part of a group of directors, managers, and shareholders likely to see the company as a means to
produce profits rather than as an entity of importance in itself;
(2) an unskilled group with little job security; and (3) a skilled
group that management would like to retain. This third group
constitutes the core of most firms and the group for whom corporate ethos remains important to the coordination of behavior.
Even for this group, however, the strength of firm identity and
corresponding employee loyalty have weakened as the firms
themselves have become more dynamic and employee career
261
paths have become more likely to involve lateral moves.
Part III.B has considered the distinct paths charted by various pools of employees, managers, and directors of the new era
corporation. Part III.C addresses what has happened to the interests of the firm itself. It also offers a normative vision of
what corporate rights and responsibilities should be after the
death of the managerial firm.
C. THE NEW ERA OF CORPORATE INTERESTS, RIGHTS, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
Corporation, n. An ingenious device for obtaining individual profit
262
without individual responsibility. –Ambrose Bierce

The analysis in this Article suggests that the description of
the firm in Hobby Lobby, a description that treats the firm as
no more than a legal fiction that serves as an instrument of its
owners, is an accurate description of the shift in management
thinking and the corresponding celebration of shareholder su263
premacy in corporate law. What neither the case nor the
259. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN,
QUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY
260.
261.
262.
263.

MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INE46 (2014).

See id. at 80–81.
BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 14, at 94 n.lxix.
AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 29 (1999).
See supra text accompanying notes 11, 97, 199–203.
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commentary on it adequately addresses are the consequences of
that description. Firms have in fact become more fluid, dynam264
ic networks. The accompanying changes have remade the relationship between owners and companies, management and
labor, financial elites and other citizens. Much of this change,
like the analysis in Hobby Lobby itself, has been unidirectional
rather than reciprocal; that is, corporate owners have remade
the terms of the commercial entities to reflect their own interests, while support for workers has not similarly adapted to
265
more fluid, dynamic, and network-like workplaces. To do so
requires going beyond the decision itself to examine the realignment of public, corporate, and individual interests, rights,
and responsibilities.
It also requires asking the question Ambrose Bierce raised
in 1911 and Dodd and Berle debated in 1930: Is corporate form
once again an opportunity for individual profit without individual responsibility? And if so, how should the State of the technological era respond?
1. Hobby Lobby and the End of Reciprocity
With the changes in the nature of the firm, legal and social
policy have only just begun to adjust. The decision in Hobby
Lobby, on the one hand, recognizes the changes in the nature of
the firm, as it has become principally an instrument to advance
266
It does not, however, fully
the interests of its owners.
acknowledge the implications for programs like the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) that follow. Nor can it. Just as the Berle-Dodd
debate of the thirties ended in stalemate because the solutions
to the corporate abuses of the twenties lay outside of corporate
law, so, too, does the debate over Hobby Lobby’s conception of
the corporation fail to the extent it focuses solely on the legal
characterization of corporate actors. Instead, the focus ought to
be on the nature of the public-private partnerships possible in
an area in which the firm as entity disappears from view. In

264. Vermeulen, supra note 15, at 712–13.
265. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, How To Beat the Bots, N.Y. TIMES
(June 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/opinion/thomas-friedman
-how-to-beat-the-bots.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=opinion
-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left
-region&_r=0.
266. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
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accordance with this analysis, employer-subsidized health care
267
becomes an anachronism.
At the height of the managerial era, the government
sought to promote the greater public good through corporations. The public safety net that took hold during the New Deal
and continued through the Great Society reforms of the 1960s
assumed that large employers were part of the solution, conferring health care insurance, pension benefits, and greater employment security on employees. Public programs such as Social Security and Medicaid supplemented what were seen as
more primary employment-based systems and large corporations were seen not just as private commercial entities serving
exclusively private ends, but public citizens. Corporations in
turn expanded provisions of these benefits because of generous
268
tax subsidies, and favorable tax treatment of corporations has
often been justified by assumptions that the firms would take
269
significant responsibility for employees. The history of special
tax treatment and of federal, state, and local economic development incentives for corporations has been premised on the
idea that businesses will create jobs, build community partnerships, and pump revenue into both the national economy and
270
particular locales. These assumptions are no longer reflected
in fact nor, after Hobby Lobby, in law.
Instead, Justice Alito’s analysis, in simultaneously treating
the firm as a fiction and imbuing it with the constitutional
rights of its owners, leads to the conclusion that the owners are
267. Our purpose here is not to compare the benefits of employer-provided
coverage—natural risk-pooling, low overhead costs, generally high-quality
coverage, and employers serving as advocates in the claim process—with the
costs or against the advantages of other systems. The point is one of structural
ideology: with the disappearance of longer term employment, the logical question is whether benefits should be attached to a single job.
268. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-141R-15, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015-2019, at 28–42 tbl.1 (2015),
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857. Before adoption of the ACA, the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance was the
largest federal tax expenditure, with an annual value of $246.1 billion in 2007.
David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of
Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed To Prevent Avoidable
Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 681 (2012).
269. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of
Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309,
318 (2011).
270. See, e.g., Randle B. Pollard, “Was the Deal Worth It?”: The Dilemma of
States with Ineffective Economic Incentives Programs, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
1, 2, 8–10 (2015).
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the firm and they therefore have rights without obligations to
271
anyone else. The corollary to the conclusion ought to be that
neither the corporation nor its owners are suitable partners to
advance community ends. The public-private partnership that
reached its height with the Galbraithian firm cannot therefore
continue, and the focus should shift from corporate rights to the
vindication of community responsibilities in other ways.
While the implications of Hobby Lobby go well beyond
health care, it is perhaps fitting that heath care underlies the
decision because what has happened to health care perhaps
best represents the unsustainability of continuing efforts to advance public purposes through corporate firms. As we indicated
272
above, the United States to a much greater degree than other
developed countries has tied health care to employment and
done so because of the nature of the industrial firm at midnineteenth century. The critical government decision came
through the tax system, allowing firms to deduct the cost of
health insurance as a business expense without counting the
273
benefit as income to the worker. The result allowed the government to promote a taxpayer-subsidized benefit by acting
through private parties. Firms received a tax break for something they wished to do anyway to remain competitive in an era
of tight labor markets, and the government relied on the firms’
willingness to offer insurance to advance public ends that justi274
fied the relaxation of wartime controls on wages.
The change in the nature of employment, on the other
hand, is part of what necessitated health care reform in the
first place, touching off cascading changes many viewed as a
crisis in insurance coverage. First, fewer employees work in
275
long-term positions that provide health care. Younger work-

271. See infra notes 281–83 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also DAVIS, supra note
5, at 117 (describing provision of social services through employers rather
than government).
273. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
274. See Eleanor D. Kinney, For Profit Enterprise in Health Care: Can It
Contribute to Health Reform?, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 405, 409 (2010) (describing
the shift from direct payment with only ten percent of the American public insured in 1940 to employer-provided insurance covering seventy-two percent of
the American public by 1957).
275. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Health Care Choice Act: The Individual Insurance Market and the Politics of “Choice,” 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
473, 474 (2007) (“[T]he erosion of employer-sponsored coverage has increased
the ranks of the uninsured.”); see also U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All
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ers, in particular, have become less likely to have secure employment or employer-provided health care than their parents;
yet, the presence of younger, healthier workers contributes to
276
the creation of low-cost insurance pools. Without the presence
of these workers, employer insurance costs go up. Second, with
more employee mobility, voluntary or not, the ability to gain
coverage for pre-existing conditions has become critical to more
277
families as wage-earners switch jobs more frequently. Third,
with greater outsourcing, more employees who would have
worked in large companies now work in smaller units. These
smaller units are less likely than larger ones to have a representative population and, as a result, may have a harder time
finding affordable private health insurance. A single employee
with cancer, who would not affect the insurance pool of a General Motors, can dramatically increase the insurance premiums
in an office of ten. Fourth, as fewer employees have health care
and as premiums rise both in many places of employment and
for non-employer plans, these plans become a bad deal for the
healthy, and people who are already sick become an even larger
278
portion of those who purchase them. The ACA sought to
counter these trends (and avoid what some predicted would be
279
a “death spiral” in insurance coverage) by mandating employer provision of health insurance, individual participation, state
exchanges for those without employer coverage, and specification of the minimum level of coverage qualifying plans had to
280
provide. The mandate that employers provide insurance and
the inclusion of contraception in the mandated coverage set up

Employees: Professional and Business Services: Temporary Help Services, FED.
RES. ECON. DATA (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
series/TEMPHELPS (charting the rise of temporary workers).
276. Kara Brandeisky, Why Young Millennials Are Turning down Health
Coverage at Work, TIME (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.time.com/money/3821525/
health-insurance-age-26.
277. Pendo, supra note 275, at 479 (discussing high rates of rejection for
those with pre-existing conditions).
278. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform’s Impact on Four
Key Groups of Americans, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1714, 1716 (2010) (“[T]he individual and small-group market is dysfunctional.”).
279. Elizabeth A. Pendo, Uninsured in America: Life and Death in the
Land of Opportunity, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 117, 118 (2008) (book review) (“The
death spiral is a term used to describe the process by which a pool of people
covered by an insurance plan loses its relatively healthy members, causing
costs to increase for the remaining members. Unchecked, the spiral continues
until the insurance plan can no longer be sustained and ultimately ‘dies.’”).
280. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012).
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the First Amendment clash in Hobby Lobby, but the declining
relationship between employment and health insurance is one
of the factors that made the ACA necessary in the first place.
Alito’s analysis in the Hobby Lobby decision underscores
the rejection of the assumptions that once made employerprovided insurance appropriate, without acknowledging the
broader implications. The analysis combines two elements.
First, the majority opinion reflects the perspective of the seventies’ agency-cost theorists, who rejected the conception of the
corporation as an entity tied to the well-being of employees and
community. In language that could be drawn from the JensenMeckling article, he observes that the firm is a fiction and,
281
since the firm is a fiction, it has no importance as an entity.
That is, when the owners decide to act through corporate form,
the corporation has no meaning separate from the identity and
interests of its owners—and the owners are free to assert what282
ever rights they would have as individuals.
Second, Alito further concludes that when the owners
choose to act through corporate form, and to take advantage of
the benefits state-chartered corporate form confers, they acquire no obligations to either employees or the community by
283
virtue of that decision. Thus, in acting through corporate
form, the Hobby Lobby owners can insist on a First Amendment right to claim the tax and other competitive advantages of
284
government-subsidized health care for their employees and
still pick and choose among the provisions included in the plans
285
on the basis of their individual, idiosyncratic preferences.
281. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
282. Indeed, at least one scholar argues that the religious freedom rights
granted to Hobby Lobby as a corporation exceed those available to individuals.
See Yvette Ann Walker, Note, More than Human: Modern Expansion of Corporate Personhood Rights in Hobby Lobby, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 297,
324 (2015).
283. As Justice Ginsburg’s dissent indicates, the decision in this respect is
at odds with earlier decisions about the structure of the marketplace that applied to individual proprietors as well as companies. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 2776–77 (majority opinion) (emphasizing benefit to employer
from the ability to provide health insurance benefits, and from the substantial
tax benefits); see also Matthew A. Melone, Corporations and Religious Freedom: Hobby Lobby Stores—A Missed Opportunity To Reconcile a Flawed Law
with a Flawed Health Care System, 48 IND. L. REV. 461, 479 (2015).
285. In Hobby Lobby, the owners objected to the morning-after pill as an
abortifacient, even though the weight of scientific opinion is that it prevents
ovulation but cannot prevent the implantation of an embryo in the uterine
wall, and therefore does not cause abortion. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N OF GYNE-
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Moreover, while Alito gives considerable weight to the employers’ right of access to health care tax subsidies, in spite of the
fact that they could choose not to provide health care at all, he
minimizes the employees’ interests because of the government’s
purported ability to deliver contraceptive access in other
286
ways.
The logical extension of this analysis, however, is the separation of employment and health care altogether, and not just
because it solves the religious freedom issue. Employers, of
course, acted to advance their own interests during the managerial era as well, but the provision of heath care through employer subsidies arose during an era in which management and
287
labor issues were more aligned. Today, the larger question is
why employers should continue to be a vehicle for the extension
of benefits necessary to human flourishing at all. The initial
adoption of government-subsidized employee benefits reflects
the particular constellation of forces at play in the United
288
States during World War II and its aftermath. The net effect
of employer-provided health care, however, was broad-based
coverage through large, private entities that disguised the cost
of a large-scale public program. Subsequent changes in the nature of employment change the justifiability of such an approach, for reasons implicit in the Alito opinion.
As a practical matter, the large firms of the managerial era
both sought to advance secular, commercial interests and saw
more of a unity of interests when it came to accessing public
subsidies to provide worker benefits. This is true in part because of the existence of a tighter labor market, which encour289
aged greater efforts to invest in and retain workers, and beCOLOGY & OBSTETRICS &
CEPTION, MECHANISM OF

INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRAACTION (2012), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/health/contraception/ICEC_FIGO_MoA_Statement_March_2012
.pdf (collecting research).
286. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780, 2782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the government could itself “assume the cost of providing” the
contraceptives or could replicate the accommodation provided for religiously
affiliated nonprofit organizations). But see Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2591 (2015) (noting difficulties with the proposal).
287. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 42. In addition, given the dominance of
large corporations in the American economy in the postwar era, the idiosyncratic preferences of a Henry Ford or owners like the family that controls
Hobby Lobby became less important. Id. at 43–45.
288. Id. at 42.
289. See CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN ED-
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cause companies strove for greater overall stability, seeking
gradual growth to a greater degree than share price maximiza290
tion. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court effectively concludes that corporate owners neither have a duty to maximize
share price (or to act to promote secular, commercial corporate
purposes) nor to take the interests of their employees into account in taking advantage of the tax subsidies of a program de291
signed primarily for the employees’ benefit. The import of the
decision is limited as a practical matter because large, publicly
traded corporations are unlikely to choose to advance religious
purposes, but such corporations are also more likely than Hobby Lobby to move plants overseas, outsource activities to independent contractors to reduce benefits, or convert full-time positions to part-time to avoid the need to pay for health care
292
benefits. As an ideological matter, the Hobby Lobby opinion
underscores the conclusion that owners have no obligation,
morally or legally, to consider the interests of their employees,
and, legally, they have no obligation to do so even where exercise of their religious preferences imposes costs on the employees with respect to access to health care provisions designed to
minimize public costs (pregnancy, which would be covered by
Hobby Lobby’s publicly subsidized employee plans, is more ex293
pensive than contraception) and increase employee benefits.
Moreover, the continued existence of employer health care
insurance continues to promote class-based differences in access that reinforce the impact of employment-based inequalities. Every person requires access to health care at some point
in her life, and health care has become that much more expensive because of the availability of third party payers, further
294
increasing the costs to those who lack health insurance. Yet,
not only do employers provide health care insurance in large
295
part because of generous tax subsidies, but the subsidies proUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY

53–57 (2008).
290. GALBRAITH, supra note 27, at 104, 241–43.
291. See McDonnell, supra note 6, at 791.
292. See Roya Wolverson, Outsourcing Jobs and Taxes, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/outsourcing-jobs
-taxes/p21777.
293. See McDonnell, supra note 6, at 779 (discussing costs imposed on employees).
294. See, e.g., Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: How Outrageous Pricing and Egregious Profits Are Destroying Our Health Care, TIME, Mar. 4, 2013, at 17–55.
295. Gamage, supra note 268, at 680–81 (noting that even before the ACA,
health care was the largest tax subsidy).
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vide perverse incentives to do so in ways that disproportionate296
ly benefit the well-off. The ACA, by retaining most of the employer-oriented system, creates much larger subsidies for highincome individuals through employer-sponsored plans, and
much larger tax subsidies for most lower-income taxpayers
297
through the exchanges. This increases the incentives for employers to recruit hard-to-get, higher-paid employees through
employer-provided health care benefits while finding ways not
298
to include low-income workers as full-time employees at all.
Even if the workers who end up with plans through the exchanges enjoy comparable health care benefits, the result reinforces employment-based inequalities, and undermines political
299
support for the ACA. In contrast, single-payer systems in
other countries decouple health care and employment, creating
more uniform identification (good or bad) with a single system.
Moreover, separating health care from employment would
not only be fairer, it would be more transparent. The existing
system disguises an important government benefit—health
300
care insurance—as a perquisite of private employment. It also cloaks the true cost to taxpayers, the cross-subsidization
that benefits the wealthy at the expense of the poor, and employer choices, that in the absence of precedent-setting Su301
preme Court litigation, are often invisible to employees.
296. Indeed, before the ACA, the individuals who did not have employerprovided plans faced both substantially higher health care costs if they paid
out of pocket and substantially higher premiums for private insurance (if they
could get it at all given pre-existing conditions) than they would probably have
faced if employer-sponsored health insurance did not exist. Id. at 676–83.
297. See id. at 672.
298. Id. at 671–72.
299. That is, it undermines political support to the extent that those with
employer-based plans fail to recognize that the taxpayers are also paying for
their plans to a large degree through the tax system. In addition, the role of
Medicaid-type benefits, which are often stigmatized where they are available,
and which make many workers worse off where they are not, further complicates the effects. See Sally C. Pipes, The Medicaid Poverty Trap Is Growing
Worse, N.Y. POST (July 29, 2015), http://www.nypost.com/2015/07/29/the
-medicaid-poverty-trap-is-growing-worse.
300. Gamage, supra note 268.
301. In the absence of the publicity attending the Hobby Lobby decision, for
example, employees might never know that the reason their health plan does
not cover an intrauterine device (IUD) is because of their employer’s religious
objection to a benefit other employers are required to cover. See Seema
Mohapatra, Time To Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care Coverage: Using
Corporate Law To Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
137, 155 (2015); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby:
Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee
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While a sudden elimination of employer-sponsored health
302
insurance would be destabilizing and health care reforms of
303
any kind may be impossible today, the time has come to establish the principle that the government needs to counter
more fluid and dynamic business enterprises through measures
that make individual workers similarly nimble, mobile—and
less dependent on particular employers. A health care system
entirely independent of employment is, in this sense, similar to
fully portable pension plans in contributing to worker autono304
my. Moreover, the ACA may ultimately speed voluntary em305
ployer choices to drop health care coverage. The ACA’s mandate, which only took effect during the 2015–16 enrollment
period, provides that employers must provide a certain level of
306
health care or pay a fine. The fine in many cases is less than
the cost of providing insurance, and the fines can be used to
307
help finance the subsidies built into operation of the system.
Eliminating the employer mandate, recalibrating existing subsidies, and/or tailoring the requirements and the fine to encourage the gradual elimination of employment-based plans
could gradually shift most insurance coverage to the exchanges,
Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153, 170 (2015) (“[A]ccording to counsel,
[the Religious Freedom Restoration Act] should be read to protect a multibillion dollar corporation against a marginal increase in its operating expenses
as the cost of observing its religious beliefs against IUDs and other emergency
contraception, but not to prevent the same corporation from shifting the costs
of that observance onto lower-income employees and dependents who believe
and practice differently.”).
302. We are indebted to Daniel Schwarcz for this and several other points.
303. Indeed, many observers have noted the illusory nature of the Supreme
Court’s insistence that the government could find other ways to provide for
employee access to contraception, given Congressional determination to undermine the ACA more generally. See Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 286, at
2550–51.
304. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 715 (proposing replacing existing tax
subsidies with tax credits based on individual income). While this would not
eliminate employer participation, it could be a first step in that direction.
305. Rick Lindquist & Paul Zane Pilzner, The End of Employer-Provided
Health Insurance, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/next
avenue/2015/03/11/the-end-of-employer-provided-health-insurance/#22c123236
4d2 (predicting that “90% of all businesses will drop offering health insurance”
in the next decade).
306. Obamacare Employer Mandate, OBAMACARE.NET, http://www
.obamacare.net/obamacare-employer-mandate (last visited Nov. 27, 2016).
307. See LINDA J. BLUMBERG ET AL., URBAN INST., WHY NOT JUST ELIMINATE THE EMPLOYER MANDATE? 4 (2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413117%20-%20Why-Not-Just-Eliminate-the
-Employer-Mandate-.pdf (finding that fines may generate substantial revenue
from employers choosing not to provide coverage).
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308

eliminating the employer role. If that happened—if all health
care depended on access to government-run exchanges or to
public programs like Medicare—it would both increase worker
flexibility and eliminate the fiction that employer-provided programs are private market creations. Whether one favors a single-payer, government-run system or a more free-marketoriented system of individually purchased private insurance
policies, it is hard to justify the continuation of an employerbased system that provides substantially less coverage than it
once did and whose primary effect is to disguise a substantial
309
federal subsidy for favored employees.
2. The Need for a New Social Contract
Ultimately, the State needs to contribute to a new model of
the networked worker that matches the networked firm and resets the balance between the two. Silicon Valley provides a
model. Highly sought-after workers start with technical skills,
get entry-level jobs that give them experience, move to the next
firm as they mature, and hope to start their own companies.
They do so in an environment where private equity funding for
start-ups is readily available, failure is not catastrophic in part
because the entrepreneur’s own assets do not finance new companies, and the forgiving job market provides other opportuni310
ties.
Silicon Valley is obviously an elite model, but the elements
that make valued employees better off than the rest of the
country once characterized a larger part of the country as a
whole. First, the job market for skilled workers is tight, just as
the job market for blue collar workers was also tight in the
308. The Urban Institute has proposed eliminating the employer mandate
in any event, arguing that it is unnecessary and has distorting effects on employment. Id.; see also Bob Seng & Holly Fistler, King v. Burwell: Last Piece of
Obamacare Puzzle?, 72 BENCH & B. MINN., Aug. 2015, at 16, 18 (“There’s a
pretty good argument that the employer mandate isn’t necessary. . . . [But]
chances of [it] going away without eliminating the individual mandate are
very low.”).
309. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 686–87; Melone, supra note 284, at
465–66. A complete examination of health care alternatives is beyond the
scope of this Article, and the purpose of this example is not to defend either a
single-payer system or the existing exchanges, which allow individuals to buy
private insurance policies at subsidized prices, but to evaluate the consequences of the uncoupling of employment and benefits—which is already occurring. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 690.
310. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 125–26 (describing the flexicurity system
in Denmark, which facilitates such a model).
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311

postwar period of full employment policies. Second, the financing of new ventures for employees who seek to set off on
312
their own is equity-based, not debt-based. This means the entrepreneur, even if not ultimately successful, acquires new
skills and experience without being crushed by loans, leaving
her free to go on to the next opportunity. In contrast, for most
others, the acquisition of valuable education, experience, and
skills has become riskier and more expensive. Third, employee
benefits are highly portable. Pensions systems today are pri313
marily defined contributions systems and the ACA eliminates
314
the ability of insurers to exclude pre-existing conditions. Finally, the high demand for skilled employees creates reinforcing virtuous cycles: employers who need to compete for valued
employees offer more to retain the employees they attract. Silicon Valley is known for its employee perks that include everything from on-site gyms to the notorious Google Bus that runs
between San Francisco and the Google offices in the South Bay.
In contrast, the labor market for the country as a whole reflects policies that produce opposite cycles. Government policies
have sought to battle inflation (even if that means a slack labor
311. If labor markets generally were tighter, employers would have greater
incentives to invest in and retain workers. See, e.g., Steve Matthews, Tight
Job Market in U.S. Cities Prompts Higher Pay, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 16,
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-16/tight-job-market-in
-u-s-cities-prompts-higher-pay.
312. See Kurtis Urien & David Groshoff, An Essay Inquiry: Will the Jobs
Act’s Transformative Regulatory Regime for Equity Offerings Cost Investment
Bankers’ Jobs?, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 559, 568–69 (2014) (detailing venture capitalist, angel investor, and crowdfunding methods of equity financing). William
Barker has explained the present, somewhat perverse, tax incentives as follows:
The current system therefore results in high effective tax rates on equity-financed investments and low effective rates on debt-financed investment. This provides incentives for businesses to finance new investments with debt, and to maintain a higher level of debt in their
capital structure, increasing the likelihood of financial distress and
bankruptcy.
William B. Barker, A Common Sense Corporate Tax: The Case for a Destination-Based, Cash Flow Tax on Corporations, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 955, 962 n.46
(2012).
313. Just How Common Are Defined Benefit Plans?, CNN MONEY, http://
www.money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/pensions_basics.moneymag/index7.htm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (noting that four percent of private sector workers
have only a defined benefit plan for retirement, “down from 60% in the early
1980s”).
314. See Gamage, supra note 268, at 678 (noting that denial of insurance
coverage to individuals with pre-existing conditions is “a practice banned by
the ACA”).
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market), encouraged the atrophy of wage and hour laws, promoted trade to the detriment of worker protections, and un315
dermined union protections. Over the last thirty years, the
law regarding responsibilities of corporations has changed, contributing to corporate flexibility (and slack labor markets)
through a wholesale assault on fiscal stimulus, unionization,
316
and worker protections. Paradoxically, Congress and the U.S.
Supreme Court have rewarded diminished corporate investment in workers and communities with reduced public obliga317
tions. Moreover, with greater emphasis on short-term share
prices and more competitive and rapidly changing markets,
even executives who might ideally like to provide more for
318
workers have a harder time doing so. These policies reflect
changes in which corporate owners and executives advance
their own interests independently of the firm while workers increasingly enjoy neither reliable employment nor comparable
ability to secure their own interests as independent actors. The
result requires rethinking the relationship between individuals
and firms not only at the top, where the transformation now
appears to be largely complete, but throughout society, as reciprocal institutions that allow workers to adjust to the new
economy have yet to be conceived.
To change these patterns requires changing the interlocking patterns of law, economics, and ideology. This requires policies that make workers more valuable, encouraging companies
to invest more to train and retain the employees they have. Doing so requires rethinking the sources of investment in workers. These policies, first, start with education, making it more
affordable. Second, basic benefits such as health care should be
independent of employment. Third, unemployed workers
should enjoy greater assistance in going back to school, retraining for needed skills, or relocating to be able to take advantage
of new positions. Finally, the government should serve as an
employer of the last resort, addressing infrastructure and service needs in schools, hospitals, and other arenas that serve
315. See, e.g., RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GLOBALIZAWORKER INSECURITY, AND POLICY APPROACHES 4–7 (2012), http://www
.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34091.pdf.
316. See, e.g., Frank Clemente, Congress’ Corporate Tax Cuts Punish Americans, CHI. TRIB. (May 28, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily
-southtown/opinion/ct-sta-tax-fairness-st-0529-20150528-story.html.
317. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1470–73 (2013).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 15, 139, 199, and 204.
TION,
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public needs. With the adoption of programs that give workers
greater flexibility, employers would have to compete more effectively for labor, touching off a change in private labor relationships. If, after all, the firm is no more than a fiction that serves
the ends of its owners, new systems should arise that allow
workers to compete in a dynamic, networked world.
CONCLUSION
This Article has described the broad set of changes that
have allowed corporate owners to respond to a more competitive marketplace by becoming more flexible in the way they
employ workers without giving workers the tools to become
more flexible in turn. In the process, owners, like the Greens of
the Hobby Lobby case, have become more independent of the
firms they control, while the workers they employ remain dependent on the jobs they hold for basic requirements such as
health care. The rise of the large industrial firm involved a concentration of power in a control bloc that could use the firms of
that era to their own ends; the ultimate solution to that concentration of power required the creation of countervailing powers
in labor and government that responded to the rootedness of
319
larger brick-and-mortar entities. The solutions did not come
320
from corporate law itself, but from outside it.
In similar fashion, it is possible to conclude that Hobby
Lobby is correctly decided to the extent it holds that corporate
owners can create a closely held company committed to reli321
gious principles, and still unfair in the degree to which it
privileges corporate owners over corporate employees in the
implementation of a program designed to serve public ends.
The larger solution, however, requires reconsidering the role of
workers in a more fluid, dynamic marketplace, and that requires recreating labor markets in which workers enjoy greater
negotiating power. In the immediate context of Hobby Lobby,
that should mean separating employment and health care altogether. Employer-provided health care exists because of tax
subsidies and these subsidies benefit those with higher marginal tax rates over those with lower marginal rates, those with
secure benefit-paying jobs over those with more transient or
part-time employment, and companies that wish to provide
319. See supra text accompanying notes 115–20.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 122–23.
321. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 6, at 780.
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health care to enhance their competitive advantage in tighter
labor markets over those employers who do not feel the need to
322
do so. These distinctions have become untenable as a ground
for public subsidies, and the most logical solution is to abolish
them. Every individual should have access to health care and
the greatest public subsidies should not be accorded on the basis of these distinctions.
The industrial firm is dead. It is time to recognize that the
firm of the technological era is a different beast. The long-term
forces have remade the commercial marketplace, simultaneously increasing competition among firms and allowing the wellpositioned and the nimble to reap disproportionate rewards.
The solution going forward should be new strategies designed
to allow workers the flexibility to also realize the rewards of the
new system, and to find security in ways more independent of
long-term employment. To that end, the emphasis should be
not on enhancing the “entity” nature of the corporation, but instead in strengthening the networks that allow individuals to
become similarly independent actors. The active role of the
State must be to help individuals thrive in a networked world.
Just as health care should be reconceived as a state-individual
relation without the employer as intermediary, so too does the
State need to engage in a large-scale project to reconsider its
role vis-à-vis corporations. With a more even playing field, corporate actors may once again find that entities capable of supplying identity and commanding loyalty obtain competitive advantages in the marketplace as well as in the world of public
opinion. In the meantime, the price for leaner firms, which
have jettisoned public obligations, ought to be fewer public subsidies with more explicit strings attached for those that remain.

322. See Linda J. Blumberg et al., Why Employers Will Continue To Provide Health Insurance: The Impact of the Affordable Care Act, 49 INQUIRY 116,
117–18 (2012). But see supra text accompanying notes 287–88.

